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INTRODUCTION
"The owl of Minerva flies at dusk." Critical understanding is partly
historical understanding; it takes time. Dusk seems to have come for
constitutional welfare rights, an intellectual and practical project of
many revered lawyers, judges, and scholars during the 1960s and
1970s. This essay is an initial effort to understand that project
historically, to arrive at some critical judgments, and to see whether
this history and these judgments suggest possibilities for
reconstruction.
Like every great effort to expand citizens' rights, this one was tied
to a social movement. The welfare rights movement was
extraordinary in the annals of American reform. Never before had
poor African-American women formed the rank and file of a
nationally organized movement. The movement assailed and
disrupted public welfare offices and programs; yet the federal
government paid its organizers and legal advocates. Its rights talk and
conception of equal citizenship broke sharply with those of past
movements for social and economic justice. It was something new and
bold; at the same time, it was profoundly shaped by the outcome of
past moments of constitutional politics and social reform.
Constitutional scholars see the origins of the constitutional welfare
rights idea in the Warren Court's Fourteenth Amendment case law
and the Court's new solicitude toward the nation's poor. This is true,
but only because of the historical context that led 1960s policymakers,
legal advocates and constitutional scholars to make welfare the
terrain on which they waged their "War on Poverty." That context lay
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in the constraints and opportunities created by inherited statutory,
institutional, and ideological frameworks-results of the victories and
defeats of earlier efforts to institute a more substantive and "social"
conception of citizenship rights.
Thus, we will see, it was the defeat of key New Deal reforms that
deprived 1960s advocates of broader channels down which to try to
nudge the Court's solicitude. FDR's vaunted right to decent work
met defeat at the hands of Jim Crow and the Solid South. Keeping
blacks dependent on local labor markets and poor relief was the
principal reason for the segmented and caste-ridden system of social
provision and labor rights bequeathed by the New Deal. A quarter
century later, this system underpinned a fairly robust private welfare
state of job security, pensions and health insurance for organized
workers in core sectors of the industrial economy. But that meld of
public and private rights excluded most African-Americans, whose
anger exploded in all the large cities of the North, where millions of
Southern blacks had moved over the preceding decades to escape Jim
Crow and rural unemployment. For them, public assistance, primarily
Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC"), stood as the
sole federal protection against poverty. It was this separate,
decentralized, and deeply gendered benefits program, stamped with
many of the centuries-old degradations of poor relief, that welfare
rights organizers and advocates sought to transform into a dignifying
right to a guaranteed income.
Only from this longer perspective can one fully understand the
accomplishments and limitations of the welfare rights movement-
and of the jurisprudence it inspired. Excluded from a work-based
world of social citizenship, the movement and the jurisprudence
sought to fashion such a normative world untethered to work. This
circumstance went a long way, I will suggest, in determining their
critical strengths and weaknesses; but the constitutional scholars left it
unexamined.
The Court and the executive branch soon set their faces against
welfare rights. The social movement died. Reigning policy mavens
abandoned guaranteed income as the appropriate national response
to poverty in favor of older ideas about improving the moral character
of the poor. Meanwhile, as the Court grew more conservative, liberal
constitutional scholars grew more theoretical. They read democratic
and civic republican political theory and built up more general, less
court-centered accounts of constitutional democracy as a system of
self-government. Still, welfare rights remained the principal way they
conceived the social substance and material foundation of equal
citizenship.
This steadfastness was admirable. Yet, on rereading the welfare
rights jurisprudence, one finds a striking gap between the rights the
constitutional scholars are championing and the reasons, thinkers, and
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traditions they rely on. The scholars' own arguments as well as the
past and present normative resources on which they draw-republican
tradition, Rawlsian liberalism-point toward a different, broader
conception of the material bases of equal citizenship. It is a work-
based conception, the very one which animated the New Deal and
earlier movements for social citizenship. The welfare rights ideal
provides an enduring critique of this older tradition; it should prompt
us to undo the coercive, caste-ridden, and gendered aspects of that
tradition, but, I will argue, it cannot supplant it.
I. THE IDEA OF WELFARE RIGHTS "DOESN'T LIVE
IN THIS WORLD ANYMORE"
How should one read the signs of the times? In 1996, Congress
repealed the nation's sole federal welfare guarantee.' In the law
reviews and the halls of Congress, no protests arose from the ranks of
liberal constitutional law scholars. The conscientious legislator 2 could
infer from this unbroken silence that Congress' action imperiled no
constitutional commitments. Lawmakers know that liberal and
conservative constitutional scholars alike fashion an aspirational
Constitution, an "ideal Constitution of best interpretations," in Jack
Balkin's words, "that academics hope will someday become the
positive law."3  And liberal and conservative lawmakers will
sometimes take their bearings from these "best interpretations."4
However, Balkin also observes that while constitutional welfare rights
were "very much on the agenda of the liberal academy '5 in the 1960s,
they are not so today. Today, welfare rights are no longer part of
anyone's "ideal Constitution. '6 Today, the idea simply seems "off the
table" and "off-the-wall." 7
Lawrence Lessig made much the same point at the first Fordham
Symposium on constitutional theory in 1996.8 In the colloquy after his
paper, Lessig set about illustrating the idea of "interpretive context"
and the way such contexts are formed by uncontested "background
assumptions."9 One such taken-for-granted assumption today, Lessig
1. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-293, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 2015 (repealing Aid to
Families with Dependent Children ).
2. See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional
Interpretation, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 585 (1975).
3. See J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65
Fordham L. Rev. 1703, 1734 (1997).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1732-33.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Lawrence Lessig, Colloquy, Fidelity as Translation, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1507,
1509-10 (1997).
9. Id. at 1509.
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explained, is that "our constitutional tradition" is indifferent to
"economic inequality."'10 "Here is Frank Michelman," he went on,
pointing to a figure in the front row. "In 1969, he writes a piece [On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment"] that simply
doesn't live in this world anymore. Why? Did he just not understand
our constitutional tradition then?"'2 No, Lessig explained, if "none of
us would write [such a piece today]," that was "a reflection of... how
our background [context] has changed."' 3
Balkin and Lessig ignore that many liberal constitutional scholars
have not quite ceased contending that the Constitution condemns
poverty-not the current Supreme Court's Constitution, to be sure,
but certainly "our Constitutional tradition" and surely the "ideal
Constitution of best interpretations."' 4  Such theorists as Cass
Sunstein, Lawrence Sager, and Akhil Amar seem still to hew to this
view.' Nor does Frank Michelman appear to have abandoned it.
Balkin recently published an important essay that plainly assumes that
attacking poverty through the Fourteenth Amendment is neither off
the table, nor off-the-wall, but instead is well within the terms of
contemporary liberal constitutional discourse. 6
So, like Banquo's ghost, the idea of constitutional welfare rights will
not die down, but it is not exactly alive, either. No fresh or even
sustained arguments on its behalf have appeared for over a decade;
only nods, and glancing acknowledgments. Some liberals, like Ronald
Dworkin, now use the idea to affirm their steely distance from
heedless activism and free-form interpretive methods; poverty has
become the paradigmatic social wrong they would not dream of
viewing as a constitutional wrong.' 7
Lessig seems to think that the idea of constitutional welfare rights
"doesn't live in this world anymore" because of unspecified but deep
changes in our political norms and our knowledge about the world.'s
This sounds overblown, but certainly, the Court, Congress, and the
nation have turned rightward; welfare has taken a thrashing, and older
ideas about poverty and improving the poor have reasserted
themselves. All this is relevant to explaining the scholars'
10. Id.
11. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting
the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7 (1969) [hereinafter
Michelman, Protecting the Poor].
12. Lessig, supra note 8, at 1509-10.
13. Id. at 1510.
14. Id. at 1509.
15. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 138-41 (1993); Akhil Reed
Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements, 13
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 37 (1990); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes:
Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 410,419 (1993).
16. See J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 Yale LJ. 2313 (1997).
17. See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law 36 (1996).
18. Lessig, supra note 8, at 1509.
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ambivalence. It is Balkin's explanation. Sandy Levinson puts the
point more sharply, 9 suggesting that liberal scholars began to spurn
constitutional welfare rights after-and partly because-
Georgetown's Peter Edelman appeared to have lost a federal
judgeship when Senate Republicans read his 1987 article, The Next
Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor."
I don't find the political explanations adequate. If liberal
constitutional scholars have grown ambivalent about welfare rights,
and scholarship about the material bases of equal citizenship is at an
impasse, the reasons may also run deeper. They may lie in a lack of fit
between welfare rights and the normative and historical premises the
scholarship relies on. The "best interpretations" may have eluded us,
because, as I have suggested, both our historical traditions and our
philosophical guides point toward a different and broader conception
of the material and distributive dimensions of constitutional equality
than is dreamt of in the jurisprudence of welfare rights.
No one has thought and written more deeply and imaginatively
about constitutional welfare rights than Frank Michelman, and no one
has approached the problem from as many fruitful perspectives. So, if
my argument rings true regarding Michelman's work, there may be
something to it. I will proceed, first, by briefly sketching the history of
this broader conception of constitutional equality, which I have called
the social citizenship tradition. From there, I will turn to the history
of the welfare rights movement and its differences with and
departures from that tradition. I'll situate Michelman's writings on
welfare rights in the context of the social movement and its legal and
political outlook and initiatives. This contextual account will set the
stage for a textual argument, a critical reading of Michelman's reading
of Rawls. Michelman's search for welfare rights in Rawls' Theory of
Justice, I will suggest, led him to overlook the extent to which Rawls is
critical of welfare state liberalism in favor of a more ambitious
"constitutional political economy," one that Rawls has dubbed a
"property-owning democracy." Michelman reads Rawls' difference
principle with an eye to income distribution and finds it flawed. He
makes a good case; however, I will argue, Rawls is better read as a
cogent liberal defender of social citizenship than as a flawed welfare
rights champion.
Michelman turned from Rawls to republicanism and developed an
enormously influential reading of the republican tradition in
American constitutional discourse; a key aspect of Michelman's
republican revival is its distinctive treatment of the distributive
dimension of constitutional property claims. Here, Michelman reads
19. Id. at 1510-11, 1517.
20. See Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our
Duty to the Poor, 39 Hastings L.J. 1 (1987); Lessig, supra note 8, at 1510-11, 1517.
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republicanism as he reads Rawls; both imply constitutional welfare
rights. But the republican tradition, I will argue, is hostile toward
welfare rights; its distributive norms point to work and the distribution
of material opportunities for self support and "independence."
Welfare rights are better seen as a critique of this distributive
dimension of republicanism than as an implication of it.
Finally, running through Michelman's writings on welfare rights has
been a thoughtful engagement with problems of justiciability and the
formal dimensions of constitutional law as law. Beyond the question
of judicial competence lies the question of whether welfare rights
ought not to be preferred over broader, work-based conceptions of
social citizenship rights because the latter-if ever America adopted
them-would stymie and interfere with democratic politics at every
turn. I also address these cogent questions.
II. THE SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP TRADITION
A. Two Egalitarian Traditions
America has known two egalitarian constitutional traditions, both
with roots in Antislavery and Reconstruction. A familiar one,
springing from Brown v. Board of Education,21 takes aim at caste and
racial subordination. Court-centered and countermajoritarian, it
guards against racial and caste-based subordination. A second, almost
forgotten one, assailed harsh class inequalities. Centered on decent
work, livelihoods, and social provision, it read the promise of the
Antislavery and Reconstruction Amendments in "Free Labor" terms,
as a guarantee of opportunities for self-improvement and a measure
of material independence and security for all. We have forgotten it,
partly because it shunned the courts and addressed its constitutional
arguments to lawmakers and citizens, but it linked Reconstruction Era
reformers to succeeding generations of Populists, Progressives, and
New Dealers. Borrowing a phrase from its Progressive Era
proponents, I have dubbed it the social citizenship tradition.'
As we'll see, the idea of constitutional welfare rights emerged from
the first tradition, as a visionary extension of Warren Court equal
protection law. Yet, the idea's defenders made the case for welfare
rights in terms that sounded more fully in the social citizenship
tradition's account of the distributive and enabling dimensions of
constitutional equality. From that perspective, however, the idea is
not a visionary extension but a torn remnant.
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22. See William E. Forbath, Castle Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 Mich. L Rev.
1 (1999). The account of the social citizenship tradition that follows draws on this
article.
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Over time and across social groups social citizenship's exponents
differed widely about what reforms their vision demanded and who
belonged to the community of full citizens. Still, all agreed that the
nation's political economy was rife with constitutional infirmities and
that the Constitution, rightly understood or amended, demanded that
the nation mend them.
Looking back at these generations of reform-minded constitutional
thinkers from the Gilded Age to the New Deal, we remember the
restraints they demanded of the judiciary, but forget the affirmative
obligations their constitutional outlook laid on the other branches of
government.
B. Populists and Progressives: The Original Republican-Pragmatist
Synthesis
Consider the Populists. Their account of constitutional crisis in the
1880s and 1890s was two-fold. "Equal rights" and the very standing of
farmers and working people as citizens were in jeopardy because of
corporate power and exploitation, and so too was popular sovereignty.
Corporate power had reduced workers to wage slaves and farmers to
indentured tenants and sharecroppers, and combined with an
overweening judiciary and a corrupt party system, corporations had
shattered the sovereign people's control of government. Populists
produced entire journals devoted to constitutional political
economy-thousands of densely argued pages melding political-
economic and constitutional analyses of the nation's banking and
currency, corporations, and industrial relations law-framed by the
general claim, in the words of one leading editor, that the
Constitution's "doctrine of equality" was "not limited to a dogma that
all men should be made equal before the law." The "real theory" of
constitutional equality was broader. "'In our Constitution the
principle is imbedded' of securing 'the widest distribution among the
people, not only of political power, but of the advantages of wealth ...
and social influence."'" "Only thus could the Nation 'maintain the
practical equality of all the people."'24 This thicker social conception
of "equal rights," he insisted, was "the great basic idea of our laws, the
very corner-stone of the republican structure."'  So, it was "'vitally
necess[ary to] discover.., exactly where and how the constitutional
principle was violated, and restore the supremacy of republican
23. Jas. F. Hudson, Railways: Their Uses and Abuses, and Their Effect Upon
Republican Institutions and Productive Industries, Nat'l Economist, May 11, 1889, at
113, quoted in Forbath, supra note 22, at 43.
24. Jas. F. Hudson, Railways: Their Uses and Abuses, and Their Effect Upon
Republican Institutions and Producctive Industries, No. 2, Nat'l Economist, May 18,
1889, at 137, quoted in Forbath, supra note 22, at 43.
25. Id.
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doctrine." '26 The Populists, then, defended a positive constitutional
order; they envisioned a "Reconstructed" political economy as the
vehicle for securing the constitutional norms of decent livelihoods,
independence, responsibility and dignifying work.'
This tradition changed in the hands of the Progressives, becoming
more state-centered and championing state-administered labor
protections and state-based social provision to assure material dignity
and opportunities for decent work. Middle-class Progressives leaned
heavily on the authority and managerial "expertise" of the new
professions. Still, they emphasized the old verities linking work,
material independence, and republican citizenship.
I have written elsewhere about the constitutional thinking of
Progressive reformers.28 Let's focus briefly on one of them. Herbert
Croly was as "modern" a Progressive as any, a critic of nineteenth
century dogmas of all kinds, yet even he was engaged with the political
economy of republican citizenship that animated nineteenth century
reform. A glimpse at Croly's theory of "Progressive Democracy" will
help us later to compare the Progressives' melding of republican and
pragmatist thought with Michelman's, and to consider Michelman's own
interpretation of his Progressive forebears.
"How," Croly repeatedly asked, "can the wage-earners obtain an
amount of economic independence analogous to that upon which the
pioneer democrat could count?" Social insurance and social legislation
were necessary, but no substitute for transforming "the wage system
itself in the interest of an industrial self-governing democracy... a new
system, based upon the dignity, the responsibility and the moral value of
human work." This was essential, in Croly's account, to "converting
civil and political liberty" under the "old Constitution," into their "social
consunation."29
26. Id
27. See Forbath, supra note 22, at 43-49.
28. See William E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor
Movement (1991) [hereinafter Forbath, American Labor Movement]; William E.
Forbath, Courts, Constitutions, and Labor Politics in England and America, 16 Law &
Soc. Inquiry 1 (1991); Forbath, supra note 22.
29. Herbert Croly, Progressive Democracy 215, 380, 384 (1914). On Progressive
efforts at creating state-based social insurance, see generally Arthur Link and Richard
McCormick, Progressivism (1983); Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers:
The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (1992) [hereinafter Skocpol,
Protecting Soldiers and Mothers]; David Thelen, Robert M. Lafollette and the
Insurgent Spirit (1976); David Thelen, The New Citizenship: Origins of Progressivism in
Wisconsin, 1885-1900 (1972). See generally, Udo Sautter, Three Cheers for the
Unemployed: Government and Unemployment Before the New Deal (1991).
On the Progressives as state-builders and would-be state-builders, see William
Forbath, Law and the Shaping of Labor Politics in the United States and England, in
Labor Law in America: Historical and Critical Essays 201 (Christopher L. Tomlins &
Andrew J. King, eds. 1992); Forbath, American Labor Movement, supra note 28;
Kathryn Kish Sklar, Two Political Cultures in the Progressive Era, in United States
History as Women's History (Linda Kerber, Alice Kessler-Harris, and Kathryn Kish
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Like John Dewey, Croly's critique of the "old Constitution" extended
to constitutionalism in general. Constitutionalism was just what the
laissez-faire jurists insisted: a limit on the democracy's capacity to
reconstruct its social environment by redistributive means. Yet even
such a thorough-going anti-constitutionalist as Croly framed the case for
reform within a constitutional narrative and interpretation of the
founding. He developed his theory of "Progressive Democracy" around
the contrast and continuities between a legalist, court-dominated mode
of constitutional self-definition and self-restraint and a more political
democratic and participatory one.
"The American democracy," Croly argued, could accept "in the
beginning an inaccessible body of [judge-made] Law," and thejudiciary's "uncontrollable" sway over the political economy, because
"the Law promised property to all." 30  This was the Constitution's
"original promise": economic opportunity and a republic of freeholders
secured by limited government and equal rights to own and hold
property. And this promise made the Constitution a "working
compromise" between the "pioneer democrat" and "the monarchy of
the Law and aristocracy of the robe."31 In industrial America, however,
Croly contended, in terms that echoed countless other Progressive
thinkers and reformers, the ideals of liberty and equality that were
"wrought into our constitutions" no longer "consist[ed] in the specific
formulation of legal and economic individualism" defended by the
courts. Interpreting and safeguarding these constitutional ideals now
properly belonged to the active law-making and law-administering
branches watched over by an active citizenry.32 This was warranted on
grounds of popular sovereignty; it also had a compelling functional
justification. Because securing the "socially desirable consumation" of
the old liberties demanded data gathering, complex and necessarily
fallible choices, and expert policymaking, the courts' authority to
interpret and apply the norms of liberty and equality had to give way.
Ending the "benevolent monarchy" of the courts was not chiefly a
matter of institutional competence, however. For Croly, the main
argument for a more democratic form of self-government and self-
restraint was "educational. 3 3 Americans were "suffering from the
division of purpose between their democracy and their Law," allowing
the latter to substitute for any profound popular regard for vision,
principle and collective self-restraint? For "popular political
education" to progress, the citizenry must assume more of the "duty
Sklar eds. 1995); Skoepol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers supra; Stephen
Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National
Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (1982).
30. Croly, supra note 29, at 125.
31. Id. at 46, 58,125,215.
32. Id. at 208-09.
33. Id. at 144.
34. Id. at 146-47, 158.
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of thinking over their political system," their basic principles, and
their "fundamental political problems." 35
Thus, in good Deweyan fashion, Croly argued for a more
experimental and participatory form of constitutional deliberation and
decision. "Progressive democracy must reject the finality of [the]
specific formulations" of "states rights" and "individual rights"
offered up by the courts.3 The problem was not the practice of
applying the "righteous ideals" of constitutional liberty and equality
to challenged laws and institutional arrangements; that "would always
be binding and liberating." The problem was "the sacredness
attached to a particular method of applying the ideals."" Instead,
Croly evoked a more responsible and active exercise of character-
forming collective deliberation and choice, mindful of the principles
that underpinned the courts' "specific formulations," and subject,
therefore, to "severe limitations" on majority will, but only by dint of
its own self-reflective deliberations and self-imposed constraints.,
Whether the pragmatist "progressive" had the better of the legalist
"conservative" was not solely a matter of reasoned argument, for the
"progressive" case rested also on a "democratic faith." 9 The faith, no
doubt, was easier come by because the imagined field of action was
chiefly that of economic relations-not civil liberties, about which
Croly, like most leading Progressives, was largely indifferent, nor race
relations, about which most white Progressives nursed a callous and
bigoted notion of evolutionary "progress." Perhaps, as pragmatists,
some of them would not be surprised to learn that theirs has proved a
partial and one-sided view of the democratic resources of "higher
law" and judicial authority.
C. The New Deal Constitution of Social Citizenship: "At the Very
Hub... is the Right to Have a Job"
In any case, Gilded Age reformers and early twentieth century
Progressives bequeathed to FDR and the New Dealers not only a rich
language of social citizenship but a narrative of constitutional change
and continuity, modes of constitutional interpretation and conceptions
of the allocation of interpretive authority that supported the New
Dealers' constitutional revolution. Demands for social and economic
35. Id. at 150.
36. Id- at 240.
37 Id. at 209.
38. Id- at 151. How best to institutionalize this more democratic form of
constitutional review was a matter Croly left to others; his only concrete proposal for
constitutional change was amending the amendment process. Some Progressives
advocated an end to judicial review, others called for empowering Congress to re-
enact with super-majorities laws invalidated by the courts. See William G. Ross, A
Muted Fury: Populists, Progressives, and Labor Unions Confront the Courts, 1890-
1937 (1994).
39. Croly, supra note 29, at 199.
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rights framed the language of New Deal reform. Whether one
listened to union stump speeches oi" the President's radio addresses,
read the bills before Congress and the debates around them, or even
attended the sessions of the American Law Institute, robust social and
economic rights talk (and ideas for institutionalizing such rights) were
everywhere. As we have seen, the idea that government was obliged
to secure conditions that enabled every person to make a decent living
harked back to the Gilded Age, but only during the New Deal did this
idea become the mandate of a national administration and a party in
power.
Already during his first year in office, FDR promised a redefinition
of the duties of government and a "redefinition of [classical liberal]
rights in terms of a changing and growing social order."4 In the past,
FDR explained, quoting Jefferson (and with Jefferson neglecting the
black laboring class), America had "no paupers. The great mass of
our population [was] of laborers... [and] [m]ost of the laboring class
possess[ed] property."4  For this yeoman citizenry, Roosevelt
observed, the rights "involved in acquiring and possessing property"
combined with the ballot and the freedom to live by one's "own
lights" to ensure liberty and equality.4 2 "The happiest of economic
conditions made that day [of Jeffersonian individualism] long and
splendid. [For on] the Western frontier, land was substantially free."
The "turn of the tide came with the turn of the century... [T]here
was no more free land and our industrial combinations had become
great uncontrolled and irresponsible units of power within the
State.
43
These "conditions impose[d] new requirements upon Government"
and new meanings on old texts. A mature industrial society could not
be governed by a laissez-faire Constitution, insulating industry and
finance from the modern claims of liberty and equality. America
needed an "economic constitutional order."'  The "terms" of our
basic rights "are as old as the Republic"; but new conditions demand
new readings. "Every man has a right to live," Roosevelt declared,
and "this means.., a right to make a comfortable living." The
"Government formal and informal, political and economic, owes to
everyone an avenue to possess himself of a portion of [the nation's]
plenty sufficient for his needs, through his own work. '45
40. Franklin D. Roosevelt, New Conditions Impose New Requirements Upon
Government and Those Who Conduct Government, Campaign Address at the
Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, Calif. (Sept. 23, 1932), in 1 The Public Papers of
Franklin D. Roosevelt 752, 753 (1938) [hereinafter Roosevelt, Public Papers].
41. Id. at 745.
42. Id. at 746.
43. Id. at 746, 749.
44. Id. at 752.
45. Id. at 754.
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FDR introduced the "general welfare Constitution" in his 1934
address to Congress announcing the formation of the Committee on
Economic Security, which would draft the administration's version of
the Social Security Act of 1935. There he also continued to assimilate
the new social rights to the "old and sacred possessive [traditional,
constitutionally enshrined common law] rights" of property and labor.
In pre-industrial America, these common law rights had had rich
significance for the "welfare and happiness" of ordinary Americans;
now, only the recognition of new governmental responsibilities would
enable "a recovery" of the old rights' once robust social meaning."'
Repeatedly, FDR and New Dealers in Congress spoke in terms of the
non-judicial branches' obligation to redeem the "new social rights" that
were the "modern substance" of the old guarantees of constitutional
liberty and equality. Always "paramount" was work, or what the
Committee on Economic Security called "employment assurance" for
"those able-bodied workers whom industry cannot employ at a given
time."'47 As the Social Security Act's sponsor in the Senate, Robert
Wagner underscored that "[a]t the very hub of social security is the right
to have a job." Unemployment insurance was designed "not to
supplant, but rather to supplement" the government's obligation to
assure work for the "bulk of persons... disinherited for long periods of
time by private industry." The Social Security Act would not work
without federal guarantees for those who could not find private
employment.1 Roosevelt concurred. A national guarantee assuring the
"opportunity to make a living-a living decent according to the standard
of the time" was at the heart of the new understanding of liberty he'd
proclaimed.49 Income security for those who could not work and public
employment for those who could not find decent jobs in the private
economy had to become the "permanent policy [of] the federal
government. '50
By 1945, when Congress took up the administration's Full
Employment Bill, the "all-important right to work" seemed secure, not
only in labor movement and reform rhetoric but in the discourse of the
46. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Objectives of the Administration, (June 8, 1934), in
Roosevelt, 3 Public Papers, supra note 40, at 291-92.
47. H.R Doc. No. 81, 79 Cong. Rec. 1,546 (1935).
48. 79 Cong. Rec. 9283,9284 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Wagner).
49. See eg., Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance of the Renomination for the
Presidency, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (June 27, 1936) in Roosevelt, 5 Public Papers,
supra note 40, at 233-34 (struggling against economic "tyranny" has given -us as a
people a new understanding of our Government and of ourselves"... inherited
understandings had brought us to the brink of "economic slavery,"... Now we know
"freedom is no half and half affair." Government has "inescapable obligations" to
"protect the citizen in his right to work and his right to live" no less than -in his right to
vote.").
50. Preliminary Report of the Staff of the Committee on Economic Security 415
(Sept. 1934), reprinted in Statutory History of the United States: Income Security 72,73
(Robert B. Stevens ed., 1970).
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liberal legal establishment. That year the American Law Institute
appointed a committee of legal luminaries to draft a "Statement of
Essential Human Rights." The staff of the Senate committee, holding
hearings on FDR's "Full Employment Bill," asked the members of the
ALI group to prepare "an analysis of the legal and philosophical
considerations that led to the inclusion of the right to work" in the ALI
Statement.sl
Liberal legal notables like these had inscribed FDR's "four freedoms"
and "second bill of rights" into the founding documents and
machinery-the Atlantic Charter, the UN Charter, Bretton Woods-of
the post-war international order. As they surveyed those new
institutions, as well as the "the forty nations whose current or recent
constitutions contain provisions granting various social and economic
rights," and put these alongside the "fundamental legislative measures
passed in the United States in the last dozen years to secure such rights
to its citizens," they concluded that "the place of social and economic
rights in any modern declaration of the rights of man has already been
decided." 2 In particular, no "modern understanding or bill of rights"
could omit the right to work, whose popular support seemed
"irresistible." Yet, this idea of a right, "which requires positive action by
government, involving complex organization and the expenditures of
public funds" seemed to many "inconsistent with the American
tradition," "paternalis[tic]," potentially "tyrann[ical]," and, at the same
time, "useless because it is impossible to go into court and force the
government... to insure that a man has a job. '53
The ALI draftsmen set out to respond, justifying the idea "in the light
of these traditional habits of thought." To those who insisted on "the
traditional legal habit of looking upon rights as negative," they replied
with arguments we will want to recall when we turn to Michelman's
discussion of this tension between social rights and legal habits of mind.
The draftsmen suggested that conceptions inherited from the
"seventeenth and eighteenth centuries" imparted "confusion" and
"rigidity to legal thinking about rights" that ill-served "the legislators
who must implement" the Constitution. Thus, they pointed out that
several of the rights in the Bill of Rights "actually require government to
take very positive action indeed ... [entailing] all the involved and
expensive machinery for the administration of civil and criminal
justice.... In terms of mechanism and trained personnel, a system of
51. John Ellingston, William Draper Lewis, C. Wilfred Jenks, chair and members
drafting committee, Full Employment Act of 1945: Hearings Before a Subcommittee on
Banking and Currency on S. 380, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1248-59 (1945) (Statement of
Essential Human Rights, The Right to Work).
52. Id. at 124849.
53. Id. at 1254.
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social insurance is child's play in comparison with the system that gives
effect to due process of law."
To the reproach that the right to work did not lend itself to judicial
enforcement, another question we will take up with Michelman, they
responded first that "legal invention [could] develop new procedures"
and second that, in any case, "immediate judicial enforceability" was not
the right test of a right. The framers afforded good authority that the
Constitution "was equally binding" on the Congress, and that the latter
"had the right to determine for itself the meaning of its provisions." "A
Bill of Rights is more than a consolidation of the fractions of freedom
already gained.... It is a directive to the whole society and a guide to
legislatures and executives in the framing of laws and regulations that
will gradually make the rights effective." The reason to recognize social
and economic rights in a Bill of Rights is chiefly to erect a standard
"around which public opinion can mobilize.., and the acts of
legislatures and executives be guided and judged."55
D. The Solid South and the Fracturing of Social Citizenship
What, then, became of the New Deal's robust conception of social
citizenship and of its vaunted right to decent work? Between the
popular ratification of the New Deal vision of citizenship and its
enactment into law fell the shadow of Jim Crow and the nation's
betrayal of Reconstruction. Measures instituting rights to decent work
and social provision for all Americans enjoyed broad support; yet they
expired in Congress. The explanation lies chiefly in what V.0. Key long
ago called the "Southern Veto": the hammer lock on Congress that
Southern Democrats enjoyed by dint of their numbers, their seniority
and their control over key committees.56 Hailing from an impoverished
region with a populist tradition, most Southern Democrats were staunch
supporters of the New Deal until the late 1930s. In exchange for their
support, however, they insisted on decentralized state administration
and local standard setting of all labor measures and demanded that key
bills exclude the main categories of Southern labor. Otherwise, how
"were they going to get blacks to pick and chop cotton, when Negroes
[on federal work programs] were getting tvice as much as they had ever
been paid" and when old-age insurance and social security bills had
provisions that "would demoralize our region," until the Southern
committee heads rewrote them.5
54. Id. at 1257.
55. 1& at 1258.
56. Key describes how the Dixiecrats exercised this power to veto civil rights
legislation. See V.O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation 345-82 (1949).
But the Dixiecrats used their veto power more broadly.
57. Senator Carter Glass of Virginia, quoted in Harvard Sitkoff, 1 A New Deal for
Blacks: The Depression Decade 104 (1978). See also, Gavin Wright, Old South, New
South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War 219 (1986) (quoting
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By allying with Northern Republicans, or by threatening to do so,
they stripped all the main pieces of New Deal legislation of any design
or provision that threatened the separate Southern labor market and its
distinctive melding of class and caste relations, its racial segmentation
and its low wages. Consider, for example, the Social Security Act. The
Committee on Economic Security had crafted the administration's
proposals to propitiate the Southerners. For that reason the proposals
favored state-level autonomy-albeit with national minimum
standards-in both the unemployment insurance and assistance for the
needy, aged, dependent children, and blind programs. Only the old-age
benefits program would be purely federal. 8 But the Dixiecrats exacted
more concessions from the congressional sponsors of the administration
bill. National standards for unemployment and old-age insurance were
dropped and the administration's commitment to include all employed
persons in the unemployment and old-age insurance schemes was
sacrificed. The price of Dixiecrat support included drumming out of the
insurance programs agricultural and domestic workers-and thereby the
majority of black Americans, who worked in these two occupations. 9
The AAA, the NRA, the National Labor Relations and Fair Labor
Standards Acts, all were tailored in this fashion. More encompassing
and inclusive bills, bills with national, rather than local, standards and
administration, enjoyed solid support from the Northern Democrats
(and broad but bootless support from disenfranchised southern blacks
and poor whites); but the Southern Junkers and their "racial
civilization" exacted a price, and FDR, willingly at first, paid up.60 This
'gentleman's agreement' that held the party together ... appeared
unshakable. The White House and the Dixie courthouse seemed solidly
allied."' However, as the new industrial unions of the CIO and the
black voters of the North loomed large in FDR's 1936 reelection bid and
Congressman "Cotton Ed" Smith: "Any man on this floor who has sense enough to
read the English language knows that the main objective of this bill [original Fair Labor
Standards Bill] is, by human legislation, to overcome the splendid gifts of God to the
South.")
58. See Arthur J. Altmeyer, The Formative Years of Social Security 14-15 (1966);
Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew 287-92 (1946); Edwin E. Witte, The
Development of the Social Security Act 3-110 (1962) (describing the history of the
Social Security Act).
59. See generally Altmeyer, supra note 58, at 35; Witte, supra note 58; Perkins, supra
note 58, at 296-301; Kenneth Finegold, Agriculture and the Politics of U.S. Social
Provision: Social Insurance and Food Stamps, in The Politics of Social Policy in the
United States 199-234 (Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988).
60. See generally, Sitkoff, supra note 57; James T. Patterson, Congressional
Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in
Congress, 1933-1939 (1967); Nancy J. Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black
Politics in the Age of FDR (1983) [hereinafter Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln];
Finegold, supra note 59; Ira Katznelson et al., Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto in
Congress, 1933-1950, 108 Pol. Sci. Q. 283 (1993) [hereinafter Katznelson, et al., Limiting
Liberalism].
61. Sitkoff, supra note 57, at 103.
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his social and economic fights talk grew more and more robust and
universal, the southern attacks began. Governor Talmadge of Georgia
convened a "Grass Roots Convention" to "Uphold the Constitution"
against "Negroes, the New Deal and Karl Marx," while Senator Carter
Glass of Virginia worried if the white South "will have spirit and
courage enough to face the new Reconstruction era that Northern so-
called Democrats are menacing us with." 2
By the late 1930s, then, roughly half of the southerners in the Senate
voted consistently against FDR. Increasingly, roll call votes in both
houses revealed Southern Democrats joining with Republicans to
oppose administration measures in the areas of labor reform and social
insurance. Even more Dixiecrats "backed Roosevelt on a final vote but
fought his program in their respective committees, in conference
committees, in supporting crippling amendments, and in block[ing]
consideration of many [labor, health, and housing] measures."' " Then
with the coming of War, the "gentleman's agreement" collapsed.
During this uncertain moment of war-time labor shortages, national
mobilization and rapid economic and central-state expansion, the Solid
South redrew its lines of toleration toward New Deal reform. Southern
Congressmen openly joined ranks with the minority-party Republicans
to defeat those 1940s legislative programs and structural innovations and
institutional reforms in the executive branch that looked toward
"completing the New Deal" by enacting and implementing FDR's
"second Bill of Rights."'64 Thus, the Dixiecrats allied with Northern
Republicans to scuttle FDR's executive reorganization plan, they gutted
the administration's 1945 Full Employment Act, and took the lead in
62- Id at 122-44. See also Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln, supra note 60, at
180-208. Early New Deal programs like the AAA had been tailored by local southern
elites and their powerful representatives in Congress to pour aid into southern agriculture
without upsetting the plantation system, the very inequities of these programs from
tenants' and sharecroppers' perspective sparked protests and national debate. CIO
organizers, NAACP leaders, and progressive New Deal administrators lent support to
grassroots movements like the biracial Southern Tenant Farmers Union, and wheedled
new programs for tenants and sharecroppers from sympathetic New Dealers in
Washington. See Sidney Baldwin, The Rise and Delcine of The Farm Security
Adrmnistration (1968); David Conrad, The Forgotten Farmers: The Story of
Sharecroppers in The New Deal (1968); Donald Grubbs, Cry from the Cotton: The
Southern Tenant Farmers' Union (1971); Edwin Nourse et al., Three Years of The
Agricultural Adjustment Adminstration (1937); Lee Alston and Joseph Ferrie, Resisting
the Welfare State Southern Opposition to the Farm Security Administration, in The
Emergence of the Modem Political Economy (Robert Higgs ed., 1985).
63. Sitkoff, supra note 57, at 123-24. See also Katznelson, et al. Limiting Liberalism,
supra note 60, at 286-302, which analyzes Southern Democrats voting patterns in eighty-
nine Senate and sixty-one House roll call votes on critical New Deal bills and
amendments from 1933-50; Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare 1-23 (1994).
64. See Richard Bensel, Sectionalism and American Political Development 1880-
1980, at 152-68 (1984); Marion Clawson, New Deal Planning: The National Resources
Planning Board 283-332 (1981); Barry Dean Karl, Executive Reorganization and
Reform In The New Deal: The Genesis of Administrative Management, 1900-1939
(1963); Katznelson, et al., Limiting Liberalism, supra note 60.
2001] 1837
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
abolishing the National Resources Planning Board.' Together, these
would have laid an institutional foundation for active national labor
market and full employment policies.' These defeated and dismantled
laws, agencies and innovations were ones that would have sustained the
public rhetoric and generated the new institutional capacities and
commitments embodied in the "all-important right to work," in "the
right to earn a decent livelihood," "to opportunity and advancement,"
"to train and retrain. '67
III. THE WAR ON POVERTY AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT
A. AFDC and the "Welfare Explosion"
The New Dealers had looked toward ensuring decent work for all
"breadwinners" and social insurance for all families against the
poverty that loomed from unemployment, old age, illness or disability.
Public assistance would "wither away" as employment assurance and
social insurance evolved to the point of protecting virtually all
Americans from poverty. The defeat of full employment combined
with the exclusion of most of black America (and similarly situated
white workers) from the main branches of the New Deal's "general
welfare state" to make this no more than a comfortable illusion.
Instead of withering away, public assistance or "welfare" became the
sole federal protection against poverty for many of the most
vulnerable segments of the nation's poor and working-class citizens.
And thus "welfare" became the terrain on which liberal legal scholars
and activists waged their "War on Poverty."
The Social Security Act of 1934 inaugurated a pension for the
elderly-what we now call Social Security, and a program of
unemployment compensation or insurance. The old-age pension and
the unemployment insurance were contributory. The Act also created
65. See Clawson, supra note 64; The New Deal and the South (James C. Cobb &
Michael V. Namorato eds., 1984). Stephen Kemp Bailey, Congress Makes a Law: The
Story Behind the Employment Act of 1946 (1946) [hereinafter Bailey, Congress Makes a
Law] provides the most detailed legislative history of the administration's Full
Employment Bill. Bailey chronicles the efforts of Truman and his cabinet to pressure
Congress into passing the administration's 1945 Bill. He makes clear that the key
players in gutting the Bill were all Southern Democrats. Id. at 165-67.
66. See Bailey, Congress Makes a Law, supra note 65; Clawson, supra note 64, at
283-332; Karl, supra note 64, at 145-78; Margaret Weir, Politics and Jobs, 132-79 (1992);
Ira Katznelson and Bruce Pietrykowski, Rebuilding the American State: Evidence from
the 1940s, 5 Stud. in Am. Pol. Dev. 301 (1991); Katznelson, et al., Limiting Liberalism,
supra note 60.
67. Full Employment Bilk Hearings Before a Subcommittee on Banking and
Currency on S. 380, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2, 4, 10, 59 (1945). See also Phillip Harvey,
Securing the Right to Employment: Social Welfare Policy and the Unemployed in the
United States (1989).
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three public assistance programs. None provided assistance to poor
Americans in general. One was for the elderly poor; one for the blind
poor; and the third, the salient one in our story, was Aid to
Dependent Children (ADC), which in the 1950s would be renamed
Aid to Families with Dependent Children or AFDC.'
Like the social citizenship tradition generally, the Social Security
Act was constructed in a gendered fashion, around the workingman-
citizen; social insurance went to full-time (presumptively male) waged
workers, and to their economic dependents. Beginning in the early
twentieth century, women reformers had built up a "maternalist"
complement to this ideal of the workingman-citizen, around the
(presumptively native-born, white) widow with children, but no male
breadwinner. Working at the level of state government, maternalists
fashioned "mothers' pensions" programs in several states, for
widowed or deserted women performing the valued citizenly service
of child-rearing, as long as they refrained from both waged work and
intimate relations with men.69 The federal ADC descended from the
state-based Mothers' Pensions programs of the early twentieth
century, themselves a modern variant of the age-old practice of giving
poor relief to "deserving widows."
Thus, all of the federal public assistance programs carried forward
the ancient distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor.
The latter were able-bodied but idle; the former were excused from
working by dint of age or disability or, in the case of widowed or
deserted mothers without a male breadwinner, the need to care for
young children. In theory, we have noted, the framers of the Social
Security Act believed that all the able-bodied would be freed from
dependence on poor relief by dint of federal commitments to full
employment and decent jobs for all. In practice, poverty persisted
among groups cut out of the ambit of federal labor protections and
federal contributory social insurance programs.
As with other branches of the statute, Roosevelt's Committee on
Economic Security had drafted ADC to propitiate the South. So the
states could determine AFDC benefits levels, and local administrators
enjoyed vast discretion in making eligibility determinations." By
keeping all childless adults, all two-parent families, and virtually all
adult males outside their ambit, AFDC and the other federal public
assistance programs left "general assistance" strictly in state and local
hands, where the classical nineteenth century liberal principle of poor
68. See Winifred Bell, Aid To Dependent Children (1963).
69. On the "maternalist" reformers and their conceptions of citizenship rights
based on motherhood, see Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, supra note 29;
Molly Ladd-Taylor, Mother-Work: Women, Child Welfare, and the State, 1890-1930
(1994); Sonya Michel, Children's InterestsfMothers' Rights: The Shaping of
America's Child Care Policy (1999).
70. Bell, supra note 68, at 33-34, 63-65, 76-79, 81-82, 108-09.
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relief-the principle of "less eligibility" -continued to hold sway: no
one who lives on relief should be as well off as the least well off wage
laborer; the amount and terms (over-bearing surveillance, punitive
work-requirements, miserly provision) of relief must be more harsh
and degrading than obtainable in the worst paid labor.7t  The
amounts, in the case of general assistance, even in the most generous
states, did not even approximate the poverty level in the 1960s (nor do
they today).
With states and localities determining eligibility and benefit rates,
AFDC itself also served as a buttress to local low-wage labor markets.
Thus, in the South, AFDC administrators deemed poor black women
"employable mothers," keeping them off the rolls when their labor
was needed in the cotton fields.72 AFDC payments in the South, and
indeed in most states, were, like general assistance, kept appreciably
below official poverty levels.
Throughout the nation, local administrators in the early 1960s still
vigorously enforced man-in-the-house rules. Through home visits,
unannounced nighttime searches, and other means, they removed
from the rolls any woman found to be associating with a man,
especially if the man seemed to live in her house. In this fashion,
welfare officers prevented public monies from supporting "immoral
women" and "unsuitable mothers"; at the same time, they kept poor
men from exploiting AFDC to escape any of the rigors of the low-
wage labor market, or the responsibilities of supporting their
offspring.73
Even for its target universe of impoverished single parent families,
AFDC reached a tiny fraction of the whole. Most did not even apply;
of those who did, poverty-stricken newcomers to a locale met almost
certain rejection. Since colonial times, wayfaring paupers had been
"warned off" and forcibly excluded by the custodians of poor relief in
the towns and counties to which they journeyed. Throughout the
country, local custodians of AFDC resources carried on a modern
version of this practice, refusing applications from otherwise eligible
newcomers, if the local welfare officers determined that they had
come for the purpose of receiving welfare. In New York, the very fact
that you applied for welfare was presumptive proof of why you had
come to the city. Rejected as ineligible, instead of welfare, you and
your offspring got tickets on a Greyhound bus bound for home.74 So,
even in New York, the rolls stayed relatively small.
71. See id. at 16, 63-65, 82, 107, 139; Michael B. Katz, Improving Poor People: The
Welfare State, The "Underclass," and Urban Schools as History 28 (1995).
72. Bell, supra note 68, at 34-35, 42, 55, 79, 83, 130, 138; Katz, supra note 71, at 28.
73. See Katz, supra note 71, at 24-25, 29. See also Bell, supra note 68, at 4, 6, 80,
213 n.7; R. Shep Melnick, Between the Lines: Interpreting Welfare Rights 57, 85-90,
98, 121-22, 130 (1994).
74. Michael Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War
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Then, suddenly, starting in 1964, a vastly larger number of poor
families began to get on to the rolls. By the end of the 1960s, AFDC
had about four million beneficiaries, of whom roughly fifty percent
were African-American." Why this sudden burgeoning of welfare
recipients? The reason was not black migration; that had occurred in
the previous decades. Brought on by the mechanization of Southern
agriculture, the wrenching displacement of some twenty million rural
Southerners, including about five million African-Americans, began
around 1940 and peaked in the 1950s. White Southern migrants
settled largely in villages, towns, and smaller cities, often within the
same state; blacks mainly moved to the largest cities of the North.76
In all, between 1940 and 1960, about three million African-
Americans arrived in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit,
Washington and Los Angeles, doubling the black population of those
cities.' The men looked for industrial jobs. They met hardening race
discrimination in many lines of work, like construction. At the same
time, mechanization and automation in industries like steel and autos
were eliminating tens of thousands of decently paid unskilled jobs;
and the 1950s' recessions eliminated tens of thousands more. s
During the 1940s and 1950s, the relief systems of the North and
South did not respond to the want generated by the crisis of Southern
agriculture. Neither in the rural South nor in the Southern and
Northern cities did the welfare rolls rise significantly in the 1950s.79
Instead, the "welfare explosion" occurred during several years of
dramatic domestic protest-the greatest moment of civic disorder in
the nation's history-marked by the epic confrontation in
Birmingham, the wave of civil rights sit-ins, demonstrations, and near-
riots that swept the South, and the "long hot summers" of protracted
rioting and clashes with police in the North's black urban ghettoes.'
Prodded by the Johnson administration, Congress came forward
with a series of programs, aimed at eradicating the "poverty amid
on Welfare 48 (1989). See also Melnick, supra note 73, at 77.
75. Frances Fox Piven & Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor. The
Functions of Public Welfare 341 (1971). See also Katz, supra note 74, at 102, 106;
Melnick, supra note 73, at 41, 73.
76. Piven & Cloward, supra note 75, at 215. See also Jacqueline Jones, The
Dispossessed: America's Underclass from the Civil War to the Present 205-09, 224-32
(1992); Katz, supra note 74, at 84.
77. See Piven & Cloward, supra note 75, at 215. See also Nicholas Lemann, The
Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How it Changed America 16, 70
(1991).
78. Piven & Cloward, supra note 75, at 214-17. See also Jones, supra note 76, at
233-38, 241-44; Katz, supra note 71, at 78-80; William J. Wilson, When Work
Disappears 53-54 (1996).
79. Piven & Cloward, supra note 75, at 217-18. See also Bell, supra note 68, at 119,
154; Jones, supra note 76, at 258-61.
80. Piven & Cloward, supra note 75, at 222-46, 250: see also Ktz, supra note 71, at
27; Katz, supra note 74, at 106.
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plenty" that civil rights protests and ghetto riots had put on the
national agenda. Among these was the War on Poverty, whose
programs would come to employ thousands of attorneys, and tens of
thousands of social workers and poor community resident-activists."'
A great portion of them, we will see, set about getting poor people to
apply for welfare and attacking the social and legal barriers to their
receiving it. Centuries-old restrictions were broken down by a
combination of civic unrest and federally-funded community
organizing and litigation.
B. A "Negroes' New Deal Thirty Years Late": The Civil Rights
Solution to Black Poverty
Welfare was not what civil rights leaders demanded from the nation
in response to urban black poverty and protest. The 1963 March on
Washington for Jobs and Freedom and the 1965 Freedom Budget and
Poor People's Campaign conveyed Martin Luther King's demands.
King's advisor, Bayard Rustin, was a lieutenant of A. Phillip Randolph
during Randolph's 1941 March on Washington campaign, and King
made Rustin chief organizer of the 1963 March on Washington. In 1964
Rustin warned the Democratic National Convention that the "solution
to our full citizenship" demanded more than "the Civil Rights Bill.'"82 It
was "essential" but insufficient "to outlaw discrimination in employment
when there are not enough [jobs] to go around." Civil rights, he told
Congress the year before, "are built on the right to a decent livelihood"
or they rest on sand. 3 Likewise, affirmative measures like job quotas
for blacks were necessary, but without full employment policies they
"risk[ed] making Negro workers into 'finks' in the eyes of white workers
whose jobs they will take." Indeed, "it would be dangerous and
misleading to call for [such measures] without at the same time calling
attention to the declining number of employment opportunities in many
fields." Rustin detailed the "displacement of lesser and unskilled
workers" in the nation's "relatively high-wage heavy industries into
which Negroes have moved since World War I" and the vast numbers of
black workers cast aside each year by the "diminishing number of
[decently paid unskilled and semi-skilled] jobs."' "We cannot have fair
employment," he warned, "until we have full employment."' 5
81. See Katz, supra note 74, at 95, 97-101; Lemann, supra note 77, at 133. See also
Ira Katznelson, City Trenches: Urban Politics and the Patterning of Class in the
United States (1981); Joseph H. Helfgot, Professional Reforming: Mobilization for
Youth and the Failure of Social Science (1981).
82. Bayard Rustin, Address to Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City,
N.J. (Aug. 1964), in Bayard Rustin Papers, Reel 3, at 27 (Univ. Pub. of America, Inc.
1988) [hereinafter Rustin Papers].
83. Bayard Rustin, Draft for Testimony on FEP, n.d., in Bayard Rustin Papers,
supra note 82, reel 4.
84. Id. at 7.
85. Id. If decently paid unskilled jobs were evaporating, "the need of the nation
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The "full emancipation and equality of Negroes and the poor," King
repeatedly told rallies and demonstrations, legislative hearings and
White House conferences, demanded a "contemporary social and
economic Bill of Rights."'  King's "Bill," like FDR's, emphasized
decent incomes, education, housing, and full employment.' The
initiative that fleshed out King's "Bill" was the Freedom Budget for All
Americans. Its prompting came from the November, 1965 White House
Civil Rights Conference, where King, Randolph and others underscored
the inadequacy of the administration's anti-poverty programs; they
provided job counseling but no jobs, they targeted black ghettoes as a
kind of "riot control" and fostered the "mischievous" notion that "the
War on Poverty is solely to aid the colored poor."' In fact, the majority
of the poor and economically disenfranchised were white, and there
could be "no Negro program for economic citizenship."'  Instead, King
and Randolph proposed their Freedom Budget, a "multi-billion dollar
social investment to destroy the racial ghettoes of America, decently
house both the black and white poor, and to create full and fair
employment in the process."' Randolph compared the idea to the
"social investments of the New Deal," noting that the New Deal's labor
legislation and public investments did more than provide jobs and foster
collective bargaining; they "evoked a new psychology of citizenship, a
new militance and sense of dignity" among white workers, and so would
for skilled workers" was not. And enforcement of anti-discrimination measures might
help Negroes gain footholds in the skilled crafts from which unions and employers
had excluded them. This was essential. But by themselves such enforcement
measures would make black demands for access seem "an attempt to steal white
jobs." The civil rights movement would not willingly fall into this trap, when, in fact,
public investment for the nation's "unmet needs in housing, education, health and
transportation" could provide decent work for all. Bayard Rustin, Lessons of the
Long Hot Summer, in Bayard Rustin Papers, supra note 82, reel 13 at 45-46.
86. Martin Luther King, Jr., Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or
Community? 193, 199-200 (1967).
87. Id. at 163, 193. King underscored the class-based character of his "Bill."
Any "Negro Bill of Rights" based upon the concept of compensatory
treatment as a result of the years of cultural and economic deprivation
resulting from racial discrimination... must give greater emphasis to the
alleviation of economic and cultural backwardness on the part of the so-
called "poor white." It is my opinion that many white workers whose
economic condition is not too far removed from the economic condition of
his black brother, will find it difficult to accept a "Negro Bill of Rights,"
which seeks to give special consideration to the Negro in the context of
unemployment, joblessness, etc. and does not take into sufficient account
their plight (that of the white worker).
David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference 312 (1986) (quoting Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.).
88. Rustin Papers, supra note 82, at 27.
89. White House Conference Transcript, in Rustin Papers, supra note 82, reel 5 at
23-24.
90. Bayard Rustin, Untitled Article on the Freedom Budget, in Rustin Papers,
supra note 82, reel 13 at 1.
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the Freedom Budget "among millions of Negroes." It would be "their
New Deal thirty years late."91
The same genre of full employment policies was pressed on Congress
and the President by the Autoworkers' president Walter Reuther and
the industrial union wing of the AFL-CIO.92 More strikingly, these
policies found bold champions among the New Dealers in the Kennedy
and Johnson administrations, above all, in Johnson's Secretary of Labor,
Willard Wirtz. Wirtz and others waged a sustained battle against the
"partial and piecemeal" social services and work counseling approach
being adopted by the War on Poverty. Eloquent in his carefully
documented accounts of the "human slag heap" emerging in the nation's
industrial regions, including its central cities where black unemployment
already had begun to "explode," Wirtz urged regional and sectoral
public investment, other incentives for job creation, and coordinated
employment services and training.93
Wirtz's thinking found a ready audience among many Democrats in
Congress, who had been weaned on New Deal economic ideas and
ideals. In 1963, Senator Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania presided over
eight months of hearings on proposed new fair employment practices
legislation, aimed at re-enacting some version of the war-time FEPC.
Clark and other New Deal veterans in the Senate, including the
powerful majority leader Hubert Humphrey, thought it plain that the
problem of race discrimination in the nation's industries and workplaces
could not be addressed apart from the factors Bayard Rustin had
emphasized. Senator Clark echoed the words of Rustin and Randolph:
"[W]e will not have fair employment until we have full employment
and... Government must take the leadership in manpower and
employment problems."94  Every black leader who appeared before
Clark's committee concurred. Even the cautious Whitney Young had
91. Id. at 8-9. When Randolph and King enlisted Leon Keyserling to lead a group
of AFL-CIO, Department of Labor and academic economists charged with drafting a
detailed program, they assured the project's continuities with the New Deal, for
Keyserling had been a principal architect of both the Wagner Act and the original
1945 Full Employment Bill. Bayard Rustin, Memo to Gerhart Cohm, et al., 12/9/65, in
Rustin Papers, supra note 82, reel 12; Profile of Leon Keyserling, Freedom Budget
Press Release in Rustin Papers, supra note 82, reel 12. For a detailed account of
Keyserling's New Deal activities, see Kenneth M. Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An
Interview with Leon Keyserling on Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 285
(1987).
92. See Kevin Boyle, The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism 1945-68(1995); Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther
and the Fate of American Labor (1995).
93. Memo, Willard Wirtz to Walter Heller, 11/19/63, Administrative History of
the Department of Labor, Vol. III, Documentary Supplement, Sec. III-B, Box 5, LBJ
Library. See generally Weir, supra note 66.
94. U.S. Senate, Equal Employment Opportunity, Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower of the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. 175 (1963) (remarks of Sen. Clark).
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"no illusions that a complete absence of employment discrimination
will... solve the problem of employment for many Negro citizens."
Congress enacted Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to address
employment discrimination. But the Freedom Budget/full employment
ideas got nowhere. Most contemporaries explained their failure in
terms of the escalating costs of waging the Vietnam War and LBJ's
desire for a cheap, quick fix for ghetto unrest. The impediments, in fact,
were deeper. Among the capitalist democracies of the post-World War
II world, the United States alone had not instituted a postwar economic
policy that gave first priority to continued full employment. The defeat
of full employment commitments meant that unemployment persisted in
post-war America, often reaching depression levels in inner cities, rural
regions, and the mid-west's new rust belt. Unemployment became, once
more, a fixed condition, a fact of nature. The echoes of New Deal full
employment rhetoric in the pronouncements of Democrats like Clark
and Humphrey rang hollow in the political context of the 1960s.
Committing the Democrats to the costly public investments and full
employment priorities King demanded-and the New Deal liberals in
Congress endorsed in principle-would have required mobilization and
coalition-building on a much vaster scale than the civil rights movement.
Perhaps a mobilized labor movement combined with civil rights forces
would have been sufficient to compel LBJ and Congress to act, and
business elites to acquiesce. But such a conjuncture was not in the cards.
The UAW president, Walter Reuther and other progressive labor
leaders supported King's and Wirtz's visions; but not the AFL-CIO
leadership under George Meaney's wing, and not Reuther's own
autoworker constituents. The latter, as Meaney pointedly observed,
cared about the pensions, health plans, job training, and job security
measures in their union contracts, not about raising hell until
government provided these things for everyone. Industrial prosperity
and Reuther's own accomplishments at the bargaining table ensured
that organized labor's grievances now came in more administrable
packages. The defeats social citizenship suffered in the late 1930s and
early 1940s, when the whole CIO demanded it, and the "private welfare
state" that its unions created in the 1950s and 1960s, meant that now the
language of social and economic rights no longer resonated for
organized workers.
C. The War on Poverty Fosters a Social Movement
Ghetto unrest amid industrial prosperity-this was the political
landscape in which the War on Poverty was waged. It explains why a
national response to black urban poverty was likely, and why large-
scale social investments and job creation, the programs civil rights
leaders deemed essential, were not what the response was likely to be.
95. Id. at 175 (remarks of Whitney Young).
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Of course, it was not only the turbulence of the nation's urban black
neighborhoods but also their votes that mattered. Urban blacks had
been Democrats for almost four decades, but only in the aftermath of
migration and protest did they begin to enjoy some substantial sway in
the national party. The civil rights movement had forced the
Democratic hand. Northern Democrats' support for civil rights
measures estranged Southern white voters, and this combined with
the concentration of African-Americans in a handful of large cities in
populous Northern states to magnify the importance of the black vote
and of wooing local black leaders. Somehow, the War on Poverty
would have to deliver the goods to poor African-Americans in the big
Northern cities, if not to end poverty or enfranchise the poor, then at
least to quell anger and violence and to cultivate Democratic party
ties.
Created by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and headed by
Sargent Shriver, the Office of Economic Opportunity was the War on
Poverty's command center. Lodged in the White House, the OEO's
chief architects and administrators mingled party pragmatism with
high democratic ideals. From the OEO flowed an array of
programs-vocational training, remedial education, college work-
study grants, VISTA-and hundreds of millions of federal dollars for
housing assistance, neighborhood improvement, and other
antipoverty efforts, including the Community Action Agencies-to
assure that poor people (and the ghetto poor, above all) enjoyed both
access to services promised by the other programs, and participation
in their governance and policymaking.9 6
Of course, there was federal legislation to relieve poverty already
on the books-public assistance, manpower development and
training, public housing and mortgage assistance, urban renewal.
These programs might have been expanded; the state and municipal
agencies that received federal educational and welfare dollars could
have gotten more, earmarked for poverty-stricken regions. For the
most part, however, the War on Poverty added no dollars to existing
programs, circumvented existing agencies, and instead, created new
organizations in the "inner city" or "urban core"-the ghetto-and
channeled hundreds of millions of dollars to them.'
From the beginning, the OEO and Johnson's War on Poverty brain
trust saw city government as a major impediment to reaching the
ghetto poor.98 If the federal money went to Northern city halls, they
96. Katz, supra note 74, at 80, 86, 88-89, 115-120; Lemann, supra note 77, at 157,
165-70, 202,206.
97. Lemann, supra note 77, at 259-60. See also Sar A. Levitan, The Great Society's
Poor Law: A New Approach to Poverty (1969); Daniel P. Moynihan, Maximum
Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty (1969).
98. Pivens & Cloward, supra note 75, at 262; see also Katz, supra note 74, at 83-87,
95, 97-101.
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feared that the white ethnic leaders of the Democratic city machines
would direct little of it to ghetto voters. By the same token, if federal
resources were given to state government agencies, there seemed little
chance the resources would reach the black poor, since Northern state
governments were largely in Republican hands, and the Southern
states' Democratic leaders hardly could be expected to cooperate. So,
instead, as one of the principal OEO policymakers put it, the War on
Poverty tried "to set up competing institutions for the traditional
services of government." 99
This hope for "basic changes" through "community action" inspired
the controversial "maximum feasible participation" provisions in the
Great Society's anti-poverty programs. Participation clauses grace
countless federal statutes, but, as Pivens and Cloward point out, "the
Great Society programs went beyond... customary rituals.""'
Instead of token representation, federal officials authorized the hiring
of tens of thousands of local community leaders, often veterans of
local civil rights activism, allied them with thousands of social workers
and lawyers, and stationed them in ghetto storefronts. From there
"they badgered housing agencies to inspect slum buildings or pried
loose payments from welfare departments.""'' Soon, to the
astonishment and ire of city politicians, they began to stage boycotts
of "unresponsive" school systems, wage rent strikes against slum
lords, and organize pickets outside public welfare departments."'-
Sociologists Piven and Cloward were brilliant participant-observers,
or perhaps organic intellectuals, of the welfare rights movement in
New York City. I frequently rely on their insightful account.
Many Great Society programs sponsored local neighborhood
agencies, but most-perhaps one thousand in all-were sponsored by
the OEO, which directed its "Community Action Agencies" to help
the poor gain access to jobs, job training, education and other
government services, and to "assist the poor in developing
autonomous and self-managed organizations... competent to exert
political influence on behalf of their own sef-interest.' t' These
agencies were to be the War on Poverty's "competing institutions for
the traditional services of government," the vehicles of "power
redistribution" that Shriver and his OEO colleagues envisioned. This
was not quite a mandate for a welfare rights movement, but it's not
surprising that welfare proved a main object of the OEO's great
experiment in empowering the poor. We have seen that massive job
creation was probably the government initiative most black leaders
thought most necessary, but it was one LBJ's policymakers thought
99. Piven & Cloward, supra note 75, at 262 (quoting William F. Haddad).
100. Id. at 266.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 271.
2001] 1847
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
was out of reach. Still, at the outset, the goods that the anti-poverty
warriors hoped to deliver was not welfare so much as education,
housing, and job training; but these proved scarcer resources.l°4
So it was that the social workers, former civil rights activists, and
ghetto residents on the staffs of the new storefront community action
agencies, like the Frederick Douglass Neighborhood Services in
Harlem, the Stanton Street Neighborhood Services Center on New
York's Lower East Side, or the Kenwood-Oakland Community
Organization in Chicago's South End, became experts in welfare
regulations."°5  Thousands and thousands of the neighborhood
residents who visited these federally funded storefront agencies were
eligible for public assistance but not receiving it; thousands more were
being shortchanged. Combing the regulations, the community action
workers found that AFDC mothers were entitled to, or at least
eligible for, a larger budget than the welfare officials allotted them.
Over time, they began to organize residents into groups with common
claims and grievances. Instead of bargaining separately for fifty
clients needing school and winter clothing grants, why not bargain
once on behalf of fifty?1
6
Thus, at Stanton Street, in the Fall of 1965 the agency's community
organizer recruited a leader among the neighborhood AFDC mothers,
she mustered others to make lists of winter clothing needs, and a
committee was formed to act as an informal bargaining agent for the
group. First, letters were sent on each mother's behalf, listing her
family's needs and reciting the departmental policy which allowed
special winter clothing grants of roughly $150 per family of four per
year. Letters went unanswered, so the Stanton Street Committee of
Welfare Families wrote New York's Commissioner of Welfare, and
when he did not respond, the Committee sent a telegram threatening
mass picketing. The Commissioner replied the same day, offering to
meet with the Committee. At the meeting, he confirmed that the
Committee's several hundred members were entitled to winter
clothing allowances and would receive them. He also proposed a
formal grievance procedure and agreed to recognize the Committee as
a bargaining representative. 107 So, hundreds of Hispanic families on
the Lower East Side received checks for winter clothing from the
welfare department, and in the next year, scores of thousands more
104. Id. at 258, 260.
105. Id. at 290-305.
106. Id. at 290-94. See also Jack Katz, Poor People's Lawyers in Transition 95
(1982).
107. The Commissioner later observed that a top New York City welfare official
had not met with a group of recipients since the Depression, when his predecessors
negotiated with the Workers' Alliance. Plainly, this Commissioner (and many others
around the country) were not unsympathetic, and probably saw in the mobilization of
welfare clients a potential boost for their own efforts to enlarge welfare budgets.
Piven & Cloward, supra note 75, at 294, 323-26.
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AFDC mothers in New York joined similar campaigns, netting
millions of dollars in new grants.03
Thousands of AFDC mothers were trained as welfare rights
advocates; many became-in the words of one social worker who
observed the process in New York-"exceedingly effective
negotiator[s] with the welfare department."w "[Like most AFDC
mothers," this social worker remarked, these women had "seem[ed] to
hold [themselves] in very low self-esteem, and to regard other welfare
recipients in the same way. Now [they] give speeches, organize[]
protest demonstrations, and negotiate[] with public officials.""'"
Throughout the country welfare rights groups began to mount
"mass benefit campaigns." As in New York, they mimeographed and
distributed applications for particular grants or allowances -school
clothing, furniture, or transportation grants, for example, or utility
allowances in rat-infested areas so that lights might be kept on at
night. Assembled at the welfare center, they staged sit-ins, and often
prompted the welfare departments to release the discretionary
grants.' In Boston, welfare rights groups led by AFDC mothers
staged a sit-in to protest the practice of summary terminations of
welfare benefits and demand prior hearings. The police beat the
demonstrators in the halls of the welfare office, precipitating the first
major riot in the violent summer of 1967. Fear that repressive
measures would provoke street violence led to more protracted sit-ins
around the country and even greater readiness on officialdom's part
to grant the demands of the welfare rights demonstrators."'
At stake was what constituted one's welfare entitlement: the
budget that the welfare department allotted or the amount of money
actually needed to meet basic needs, like winter clothing, new shoes
for school, or a kitchen table and chairs. At stake also was dignity, not
only as dignity finds expression in decent clothing or a table at which
to sit with one's family, but also in matters like midnight searches for
men-in-the-house, or summary terminations without being notified or
heard.13
108. See Felicia Kornbluh, To Fulfill Their "Rightly Needs" Consumerism and the
National Welfare Rights Movement, 69 Radical Hist. Rev. 76 (1997).
109. Piven & Cloward, supra note 75, at 298.
110. Id. at 294.
111. Id. at 324-25; Kornbluh, supra note 108, at 97; Katz, supra note 106, at 84-85.
See also Larry R. Jackson & William A. Johnson, Protest by the Poor. The Welfare
Rights Movement in New York City (1974); Jacqueline Pope, Organizing Women on
Welfare: Planning at the Grass Roots Level (1986).
112. Piven & Cloward, supra note 75, at 330-36.
113. Sit-ins and threatened legal action by the Stanton Street Committee prompted
the New York City department to halt these raids. Piven & Cloward, supra note 75, at
324-25. On both these aspects of dignity and welfare provision, see Lucie E. White,
Subordination, Rhetorical Survivor and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearings of Mrs.
G., 38 Buffalo L. Rev. 1 (1990).
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From this welter of organizing activity, grievances and rights talk
emerged a national organization and movement. In Spring, 1966,
George Wiley left his post as associate national director of the
Congress on Racial Equality to open the Poverty/Rights Action
Center in Washington, D.C. Within CORE and the civil rights
movement, Wiley had championed connecting black civil rights with
economic concerns, particularly black urban poverty in the North."4
He described the Poverty/Rights Action Center as a meeting point of
the civil rights and anti-poverty movements. Under Wiley's
leadership that Center became the organizing vehicle for the National
Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO), welding together welfare
rights groups across the country and spurring the staffs of anti-poverty
agencies to redouble their efforts among welfare recipients. In
February 1967, leaders representing 200 welfare rights groups in 70
cities answered Wiley's call for a first national meeting. By 1969,
NWRO claimed more than 100,000 dues-paying members in some 350
local organizations. The NWRO national chairman was Johnnie
Tillmon, an AFDC mother from Watts who had organized the
nation's first welfare rights group. Its vice-chairmen were Beulah
Sanders, an AFDC recipient leader of the City-Wide Coordinating
Committee of Welfare Groups in New York City, and Carmen Olivo,
a recipient leader in New York's Lower East Side. 1 5
D. The NWRO and the Right to a "Guaranteed Adequate Income":
Gender, Race, and Citizenship in the Consumers' Republic
The NWRO marked a genuine rupture in the history of American
social movements; it broke sharply with the reform language
bequeathed by previous movements for social and economic justice.
The WRO broke the links these older movements forged between
work and citizenship. Like the earlier movements for social
citizenship, the WRO claimed decent income as a right; unlike them,
it did not tie this right to wage work. As we've seen, generations of
reformers had constructed the social citizenship ideal in a gendered
fashion, around the workingman-citizen; social insurance would go to
full-time (presumptively white male) waged workers, and to their
economic dependents. Beginning in the 1900s, women reformers had
built up a "maternalist" complement to this ideal, around the
(presumptively native-born, white) widow with children, but no male
breadwinner. Analogizing to the nation's first major social insurance
program, the Civil War pensions, which reached the families of
hundreds of thousands of union soldiers, these women fashioned
114. See August Meier & Elliott Rudwick, CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights
Movement 334-36, 406-07 (1975); Nick Kotz & Mary Lynn Kotz, A Passion for
Equality: George Wiley and the Movement (1977).
115. Piven & Cloward, supra note 75, at 322 n.28. See also Kotz & Kotz, supra note
114.
1850 [Vol. 69
CONSTITUTIONAL WELFARE RIGHTS
"mothers' pensions" programs. The predecessors to AFDC, these
were state-based entitlements for women performing the valued
service of child-rearing, as long as they refrained from both waged
work and intimate relations with men. 116
Until the work of Felicia Kornbluh, no chronicler had captured the
distinctive rights consciousness and vision of citizenship fashioned by
the welfare rights movement. 7 As Kornbluh points out, the NWRO
spurned both these older models of citizenship; its activists saw the
citizen as a black woman, or a Latina or white working-class woman,
raising children without regular financial help from a man. "' Unlike
the early twentieth century "maternalists" whose thinking shaped
AFDC, NWRO activists did not oppose wage work for mothers, nor
did they think it right for the state to demand from women sexual and
romantic abstinence in exchange for public assistance. But unlike
post-war liberal feminists, they did not categorically endorse wage
work for women or make sexual freedom a core value. "Waged
work," Kornbluh remarks, "could be coercive as well as liberatory,
and full-time child rearing on the economic margins a challenge as
well as a joy."" 9 Women in the NWRO did not valorize one option
over the other; instead they staunchly opposed a welfare state that
forced citizens to choose a particular form of work, childcare, family
structure or intimate association.
For them, a "Guaranteed Adequate Income" was an unconditional
citizenship right, essential to equal respect, and an appropriate
touchstone of equality in an affluent nation. That income would be
available to both men and women regardless of whether they were in
the labor market or whether they were raising children. The focus on
income and not employment resonated with (what we'll see was) a
widespread view in 1960s America that affluence had diminished the
need for universal labor force participation. Income, not
employment, also spoke to "modern women's" paradigmatic
economic activity, the work of managing family and household
through the consumer marketplace.
"Give Us Credit for Being Americans," read the NWRO's placards
demanding Sears credit cards for welfare recipients." ° The NWRO's
was a consumers' republic. Poor black women had not been
welcomed into the producers' republic of earlier reformers. And they
had had enough experience with northern urban labor markets to
116. On the "maternalist" reformers and their conceptions of citizenship rights
based on motherhood, see Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, supra note 29;
Ladd-Taylor, supra note 69; Michel, supra note 69.
117. In addition to Kornbluh, supra note 108, and Kornbluh, infra note 121, see
Felicia Kornbluh, The Rise and Fall of Welfare Rights: Women, Poverty, and
American Law (forthcoming) [hereinafter Kornbluh, Rise and Fall].
118. See Kornbluh, Rise and Fall, supra note 117, at 6.
119. Id. at 6-7.
120. Kombluh, supra note 108, at 84-94.
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know that many black women who wanted a job could not find one,
especially one with decent wages. As leaders and activists in the
NWRO, these women defended the organization's demand for a
guaranteed income as giving each of them the "right to decide herself
whether she is needed by her children as a full time mother and
whether she is able to ... work" outside home. 12  Nor were they
willing to dignify work that left them "worse off than they were
before."' 22 Those who could work, would work; but they must have
"decent jobs with adequate wages." 123 A decent income could not be
tied to participation in "dead end" work programs or to the bleak
prospect of an unregulated, irregular, exploitative labor market.
Rather a decent income was a matter of right; part of being treated
like a human being, part of having one's dignity and freedom in 1960s
America was being able to participate in the nation's consumer
economy.124 AFDC recipient spokeswomen made plain the indignities
of being unable to afford decent clothes and even an occasional
luxury. "[Flood and rent is not all of life. Why shouldn't we be able to
buy perfume once in a while... or even a watch.... Our children...
don't have decent clothes [or] things that other children take for
granted-enough school supplies, money for a class trip, a graduation
suit or dress." 125
For his part, George Wiley knew about efforts to address inner city
poverty by "completing the New Deal," as Labor Secretary Wirtz
urged. Wiley had no brief against bold public investment and job
creation in the deindustrializing cities. Rather, he took the measure of
Johnson's War on Poverty and rightly decided that no such costly
national commitments would be forthcoming, least of all in a fashion
that would reach the poorest Americans. For welfare recipients,
Wiley and the NWRO leadership believed, work programs were more
likely to end in punishment than opportunity. So when Wiley and
NWRO vice-chair Beulah Sanders of New York's City-Wide
Coordinating Committee appeared before the Joint Economic
Committee of Congress in 1968, they declared that the "way to do
something about poverty is to give people the money they need to
meet the basic necessities of life at least at a minimum level for health,
121. Draft Letter from NWRO President Johnnie Tillmon and George Wiley, to
Robert Finch, Secretary of HEW, quoted in Felicia Kornbluh, The Goals of the
National Welfare Rights Movement: Why We Need Them Thirty Years Later, 24
Feminist Stud. 65, 73 (1998).
122. Kornbluh, supra note 108 at 97. See also Kotz & Kotz, supra note 114, at 16-
17.
123. Kornbluh, supra note 121, at 68.
124. See Kombluh, supra note 108, at 78-79.
125. Kornbluh, supra note 121, at 72 (quoting Juliet Greenlaw, Statement of
National Welfare Rights Organization to the Democratic Platform Hearing (Aug. 16,
1968)).
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decency and dignity."1" Asked about work programs, they said they
were coercive and demeaning; and pointed to a world of experience
with programs that were just that.- Wiley shrewdly dissected the
ways that employment-based federal social provision either excluded
the work that poor people did, or was molded to the image of a
household with a male breadwinner and stay-at-home wife - an image
increasingly at odds with poor women's lives.'1
That Congress and middle-class America would be forthcoming
with a generous guaranteed income untethered to work today seems
deluded. Today it seems wildly shortsighted to have spurned all talk
of work programs and job training. Welfare rights were essential to
meeting the immediate needs of the NWRO's constituents; but
welfare rights were no basis for ending the social and economic
marginality and stigmatization of the black poor. Perhaps only by dint
of mimicking AFDC could a social movement of the poorest, most
powerless Americans have been forged. By making AFDC-eligible
women the movement's constituents, welfare rights organizers had
something to offer in exchange for rank-and-fie participation, and
rank-and-file members developed some sense of efficacy and
entitlement by gaining their demands from the nation's welfare
departments. Likewise, as we are about to see, AFDC provided a
basis for substantial gains through litigation.
But mimicking AFDC came at a price. It led to the absence of poor
men in a movement that claimed to represent the nation's poor and
their needs. As a consequence, it led to a rights rhetoric that
downplayed the disappearance of decently paid unskilled industrial
jobs from the nation's old industrial regions and center cities. This
was the social fact that leaders like King and Rustin had highlighted
and called on Congress to remedy as a necessary condition for the
"full emancipation and equality of Negroes and the poor."
Instead, the War on Poverty provided organizers and attorneys to
help wage a struggle for welfare rights. Gaining welfare as a matter of
right would relieve unwarranted suffering and indignity. But it would
not do enough to help poor blacks make their way into a shared social
destiny of work and opportunity. Without other enabling rights to
training, decent work, and childcare, welfare rights risked
modernizing the historical badges and incidents of racial and
economic subordination instead of abolishing them. Welfare rights
risked saddling poor African-Americans with a new variant of the old
racial imagery of blacks as idle and dependent.
126. Id at 68 (quoting George Wiley, Testimony for the National Welfare Rights
Organization Before the Fiscal Policies Sub-Committee of the Joint Economic
Committee of the U.S. Congress (June 12, 1968)).
127. Id. See also Kotz & Kotz, supra note 114, at 277.
128. Kornbluh, supra note 121, at 68-69.
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Toil outside the home always had been the lot of poor African-
American women. In white Americans' social imagination, the
"domestic sphere" ideal-that woman's work was in her home,
rearing children and keeping house for husband or father-rarely
extended to black women, certainly not to poor ones. 129 At a moment
when increasing numbers of white working- and middle-class women
were entering the waged labor force, it was unlikely that white
America would accommodate a reform vision whose aim seemed to
be affording poor black women the right to decide to enter the wage
force or not. More important, without the other enabling rights just
mentioned, which Wiley viewed so suspiciously, the vision did not do
enough to enable poor black women (or men) to participate in that
common destiny and the dignity it afforded.
In the late 1960s, however, a broad swathe of economists and social
policy mavens agreed with the guaranteed income idea.30 For a
Milton Friedman, a miserly guaranteed income was the least
bureaucratic, most efficient, and libertarian way to address the social
costs of unrelieved poverty. 13a A great many liberal economists also
endorsed the idea. Often they viewed it as second-best to job
creation, but concluded that the latter was too costly. 3 Still others
based their support on the (mistaken) view that jobs were
disappearing in the wake of automation.33 As unskilled and semi-
skilled industrial jobs disappeared, they reasoned, one could no longer
combat poverty through minimum wage laws or fair labor standards;
one needed to provide decent incomes directly. And since American
prosperity no longer depended on ample labor reserves, it was only
sensible to do so. Liberal social policy mavens were also often moved
by the history of the poor laws, the workhouse, and the more recent
work programs Wiley and Sanders described, to view any effort to
address poverty through work as illiberal."3
Even in 1969, the year LBJ left Washington and Richard Nixon
arrived-and the year Michelman published Protecting the Poor-a
guaranteed income or broadly inclusive federal welfare rights
continued to seem attainable. That year Nixon proposed abandoning
AFDC, with its perverse exclusion of two-parent families and its
disparate state-based eligibility standards and benefit levels, and
replacing it with a uniform national program covering all families in
need. Admitting that "this new system will cost more than welfare,"
129. See Jacqueline Jones, Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow: Black Women, Work,
and the Family from Slavery to the Present (1985).
130. See Mickey Kaus, The End of Equality 112-14 (1992).
131. Id. at 113.
132 Id. at 114.
133. Id. at 38. See also Ben B. Seligman, Automation and the Work Force in The
Guaranteed Income: Next Step in Economic Evolution? 59-80 (Robert Theobald, ed.,
1965); Shoshana Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart Machine (1988).
134. See Kaus, supra note 130, at 115.
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Nixon explained that under his proposed family assistance plan
"benefits would go to the working poor, as well as the non-working; to
families with dependent children headed by a father, as well as to
those headed by a mother; and a basic Federal minimum would be
provided, the same in every state." '35
If this ill-starred family assistance plan was a liberal step into the
unknown, the existing welfare system was a "colossal failure,"
"bringing states and cities to the brink of financial disaster, but...
failing to meet the elementary human, social, and financial needs of
the poor.""3 This widely shared view that welfare needed dramatic
change flowed from the burgeoning numbers of AFDC recipients and
intensifying conflicts around their demands on and treatment by
welfare departments-numbers and conflicts brought on by the social
movement the Johnson White House had nurtured.
IV. WELFARE RIGHTS IN THE COURTS
A. The Federal Legal Services Program and the
Welfare Rights Attorneys
That the needed change lay in a more uniform and universal, more
rights-based regime was a sentiment lawyers and judges had a hand in
shaping. From the beginning, the staffs and organizers at the OEO's
Community Action Agencies had like-minded attorneys nearby, for
the OEO also created and funded the new Legal Services Program.
Within a year of its creation, OEO provided its Legal Services
Program with a budget roughly double that of the nation's existing
legal aid societies. 37 OEO also wanted Legal Services projects to
develop a form of law practice sharply different from what Shriver
and his staff saw as the conservative "charity case" approach of
traditional legal aid offices.1 8 They insisted that the Legal Services
funds go toward creating "neighborhood law offices" chiefly in the
nation's inner cities, and they demanded that these offices undertake
new and controversial forms of representation, above all impact
litigation aimed at reforming existing rules, regulations, and practices
in areas like welfare and public and private housing.139 By 1970, OEO
135. Richard M. Nixon, Nationwide Radio and Television Address (Aug. 8, 1969),
quoted in Daniel P. Moynihan, The Politics of a Guaranteed Income: The Nixon
Administration and the Family Assistance Plan 222-23 (1973). Also, the proposed
plan scaled benefits "so it would always pay to work," and it included work
requirements for everyone but mothers of pre-school children, as well as additional
daycare center funding, to encourage them to work as well. Id.
136. Id. at 221.
137. Piven & Cloward, supra note 75, at 306 n.18.
138. Katz, supra note 106, at 65-66.
139. Piven & Cloward, supra note 75, at 315.
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had established some 300 legal services projects operating about 850
neighborhood law offices with about 2000 attorneys.1 40
Working closely with community action agencies like Stanton Street
and Kenwood-Oakland, hundreds of these LSO attorneys were drawn
into welfare rights litigation, and OEO began to fund back-up centers
in leading law schools-foremost was Columbia's Center on Social
Welfare Policy and Law-to build up expertise, fashion test-case
strategies, and train the storefront attorneys.14' Never had a reform
movement's lawyers been so mindful of the "movement" character of
their work. Young LSO attorneys frequently compared themselves
with older counterparts at the ACLU and NAACP Legal Defense
Fund. Unlike the latter, LSO lawyers meant to combine litigation
with mobilization. Thus, they embraced the craft of test-case
litigation, which the Legal Defense Fund had perfected, but Legal
Services lawyers strove to be more attentive to the most deeply felt
grievances of welfare recipients themselves. So they set about
exploring with grassroots leaders which legal challenges held out the
most promise for mobilizing the rank and file.1 42
B. The "Fair Hearings" Campaign
When LSO attorneys brought Goldberg v. Kelly143 to the Supreme
Court, claiming pre-termination hearings as a procedural due process
right, they were litigating an issue-summary terminations-which, as
we have seen, had spawned sit-ins and mass demonstrations at welfare
departments across the country.1" The right to a hearing has not been
treated kindly by critical legal scholars looking back on Goldberg v.
Kelly and the welfare rights movement. It has seemed a quintessential
lawyer's process-based reform, easily routinized within the welfare
bureaucracy, its pursuit sapping movement energy and gaining
nothing of substance.145 In fact, welfare rights attorneys and activists
were hardly unaware of the limitations and shortcomings of hearings
140. Katz, supra note 106, at 65-66.
141. Id. at 79-81; see also Martha F. Davis, Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare
Rights Movement, 1960-1973 (1993); Martin Garbus, Ready for the Defense (1971);
Susan E. Lawrence, The Poor in Court: The Legal Services Program and Supreme
Court Decision Making (1990); Edward V. Sparer, The Role of the Welfare Client's
Lawyer, 12 UCLA L. Rev. 361 (1965); Edward V. Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in
The Rights Of Americans: What They are-What They Should Be (1971) [hereinafter
Sparer, The Right to Welfare].
142. See Katz, supra note 106, at 65-66, 68-69, 78, 86, 90, 142-43; Melnick, supra
note 73, at 65, 75-80.
143. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
144. See Davis, supra note 141, at 101-03; Lawrence, supra note 141, at 133-34;
Piven & Cloward, supra note 75, at 324.
145. See, e.g., William Simon, Legal Entitlements, Bureaucracy and Class in the
Welfare System, 92 Yale L. J. 1198 (1983); William Simon, Rights and Redistribution in
the Welfare System, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1431 (1986); Mark Tushnet, The Critique of
Rights, 47 SMU L. Rev. 23 (1993).
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rights. Legal tactics could not replace direct action, and welfare
hearings could yield bitter fruits; but, as Kornbluh points out, the
demand for a hearing was one of the few levers in the welfare
machinery that lent recipients any power at all.4 ' The original Social
Security Act of 1935 already provided for "fair hearings" to enable
ADC recipients to challenge administrative decisions. OEO-funded
attorneys first seized on these provisions, which had been dormant for
the Act's first thirty years, in 1965, and used them-often in
conjunction with demonstrations and picketing by welfare rights
groups-to gain benefits, publicity and leverage for their clients. The
offer of legal and practical help in claiming lost or denied AFDC
benefits or basic needs grants was probably the most important
currency that groups affiliated with NWRO could offer rank-and-file
recruits. 147
Columbia's Center for Social Welfare Policy and the Law (CSWPL)
led the Goldberg v. Kelly litigation; CSWPL also orchestrated the
broader campaign waged by LSO lawyers around the country in what
the Columbia back-up center called "the struggle to establish a legal
right to an adequate welfare grant... for all persons in need of
financial assistance." 148 CSWPL's first director was Ed Sparer, whose
teaching and writings educated a generation of Legal Services
attorneys about welfare rights advocacy.14 9
Sparer's view of the "fair hearing" was an activist one. He held
classes for AFDC recipients to train them to represent themselves in
the hearings, and persuaded New York welfare rights organizers, and
then national leaders like Wiley, to experiment with fair hearings.
Wiley, for his part, envisioned using the fair hearing roughly as the
civil rights movement had used legal tactics in Birmingham a few
years earlier. There, the movement had flooded the courts and
prisons with protestors aiming to make an oppressive state apparatus
unmanageable and crisis-ridden.1 50
For a brief season, the fair hearings campaigns waged by welfare
rights groups in New York and elsewhere had just such an impact.
Organizers delivered hundreds of fair hearing applications to welfare
offices and accompanied them with pickets. The costs of conducting
hearings encouraged the granting of "basic needs" and school clothing
applications without quarrel. Kornbluh tells us that the chair of the
New York State Board of Social Welfare declared that these
146. See Felicia Kornbluh, "Legal Civil Disobedience": The National Welfare Rights
Movement and Administrative Fair Hearings, (unpublished manuscript on file with
author).
147. See id.
148. Sparer, The Right to Welfare, supra note 141, at 65.
149. See id.; Davis, supra note 141, at 34-35; Sparer, The Role of the Welfare Client's
Lawyer, supra note 141.
150. See Kornbluh, supra note 146, at 4-5.
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campaigns came "'close to breaking down the system'." The
campaigns drove the head of New York City's Department of Social
Services to conclude "that the federal government should take over
responsibility for all welfare programs. 151
For welfare rights attorneys, pre-termination hearings held out
much the same kind of promise. About Goldberg v. Kelly, Sparer
later wrote that taking the case to the Supreme Court responded to
the grass roots demand to be heard before losing one's benefits. It
was "part and parcel of the organizing strategy of the welfare rights
movement, designed to amplify the organized forces-particularly the
organized welfare recipient forces-of the movement." A prior
hearing would enable recipients to "talk back and resist and still have
some protection." '152
We will return to the Goldberg Court's significant utterances. From
the point of view of welfare rights, though, by the time Goldberg was
decided, the political tide had turned. White backlash and "taxpayers'
revolts" had prompted welfare reductions in many states. Some
defrayed hearings costs by reducing benefits, and, as with all such
tactics, New York's welfare system had found ways to absorb mass
hearings campaigns. Efforts to enable welfare recipients to represent
themselves were faltering, and Legal Services or volunteer lawyers
and law students were becoming scarcer. But we blunder if we blame
Goldberg for the tides that swamped it.
C. The Welfare Rights Legal Strategy
In his most comprehensive account of the welfare rights lawyers'
strategy, Sparer explained that the "initial legal and organizational
strategy" was "directed against exclusions of needy citizens who fall
within the federal categories." However, the "long-range goal...
during the 1965-1970 period was to end the categorical nature of the
welfare system. ' 153 In the courts, statutory construction could carry a
good deal of the burden of eliminating state-imposed eligibility
requirements and state and local "tests for aid and exclusions from
aid... [that were] unrelated to need."'" The second goal-ending the
categorical nature of federal welfare in favor of a universal
entitlement-was one that only constitutional adjudication could
151. See id. at 12-13.
152. Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social
Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 Stan. L. Rev.
509, 563 (1984). Prior hearings responded in some modest measure to the dignitary
aspirations of the movement. See White, supra note 113. For a number of years the
cost of providing prior hearings also prompted many welfare departments to accede
to various extensions of benefits to entire groups of recipients where previously they
would have terminated those benefits. See Piven & Cloward, supra note 75, at 310,
324.
153. Sparer, The Right to Welfare, supra note 141, at 67.
154. Id. at 66-67.
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accomplish in the courts, and of course, the Court's Constitution
stopped well short of it.
Even reaching the threshold of Sparer's first strategy-challenging
state and locally imposed tests and exclusions-required many
doctrinal innovations, which LSO attorneys gained in the federal
courts. It demanded recognizing a private right of action against the
state welfare agencies that administered AFDC,155 revising or ignoring
jurisdictional rules that seemed to bar the way,'-6 and spurning the
conventional remedy of federal funding cut-offs in favor of injunctive
relief.L' Above all, it required reversing the view, shared by judges,
welfare administrators, and members of Congress alike for the first
thirty years of AFDC's existence, that under AFDC states had
authority to run their own programs, imposing such conditions and
standards as they chose, subject only to a handful of limitations listed
in the federal statute.1 58
In place of that view, and the vide berth it left for state discretion,
came a new presumption: a heavy burden lay on state lawmakers and
administrators to justify any exclusion, test or condition that deviated
from the principle of "actual need." By persuading the federal courts
to embrace this presumption and to wield it against hundreds of state
rules excluding would-be AFDC recipients, the LSO attorneys went a
long way toward realizing Sparer's initial goal.5 9 Within the federal
statutory categories, the federal courts in the 1960s and early 1970s
proved remarkably willing to treat welfare under AFDC as a right of
all needy individuals.
The leading case was King v. Smith,"W which struck down an
Alabama welfare rule-issued in 1964 by Governor George
Wallace-against would-be recipients found to have a man living in
the home or visiting frequently "for purpose of cohabiting." Children
with such a "substitute parent" lost their AFDC eligibility. Under the
rule, Alabama dropped 16,000 children-90% of them black-from
the rolls. The three-judge court below had struck the rule down on
equal protection grounds.' 61 At oral argument, however, plaintiffs
LSO attorney sought a statutory ruling. "[I]f the decision goes off as
the lower court's did, then very little will have been accomplished.
155. See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private
Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1195, 1289 (1982).
156. See, eg., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 534-35 n.5, 537, 541-42 (1974); King
v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 n.3 (1968).
157. See Melnick, supra note 73, at 50.
158. See Bell, supra note 68; Martha Derthick, The Influence of Federal Grants:
Public Assistance in Massachusetts (1970); Wilbur J. Cohen, The Social Security Act
of 1935: Reflections Fifty Years Later, in The Report of the Committee On Economic
Security of 1935: The 50th Anniversary Edition (1985).
159. See Davis, supra note 141; Lawrence, supra note 141.
160. 392 U.S. at 309.
161. King v. Smith, 277 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
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Even if we win in Alabama, HEW will not stop similar practices in
other states [where man-in-the-house rules had no such discriminatory
purpose or effect]."'62 A statutory holding, "would give us all we
wanted," providing "a way in which the narrowest of rulings would
have the broadest of implications... [G]ive us," counsel asked the
Court, "a decision interpreting the Social Security Act as having
rejected the concept of a worthy and an unworthy poor."' 63 And the
Court did so, giving welfare rights attorneys a reading of the Act that
would shape AFDC case law for the next two decades. In the face of
legislative history that ran mostly to the contrary, a unanimous
Supreme Court concluded that in 1935 Congress had intended that all
"needy, dependent children" would be entitled to AFDC benefits, and
that states and localities could not enforce their own narrower
definitions of eligible parents. Thus, Alabama, in dispersing AFDC,
could not decide that Mrs. Smith's occasional visitor and lover (a Mr.
Williams with nine children of his own) was a "substitute parent" and
breadwinner whose visits to Mrs. Smith disqualified her and her
children from the federal entitlement."6  Chief Justice Warren put
aside a wealth of legislative history suggesting that Congress indeed
did mean to allow states to apply their own standards of "moral
character" and "suitability" (acquiescing, as we saw, to the Dixiecrats'
insistence on retaining local control over poor relief). This history
would have been quite relevant at one time, because the "social
context" in 1935 was one in which the distinction between the
"worthy" poor and the "undeserving" was generally accepted. 65 Now
both society and Congress took a different view, "more sophisticated
and enlightened than the 'worthy-person' concept of earlier times.' ' 66
The evidence that the Congresses that enacted the various post-1935
amendments to AFDC shared the Warren Court's enlightened
perspective was scant at best. 67  Nonetheless, the Chief Justice
proceeded to read the preamble and statement of purpose of the 1935
Act itself to mean that AFDC "was designed to meet a need unmet by
programs providing employment for breadwinners."'' " Thus, "at the
same time that it intended to provide programs for the economic
security and protection of all children... [Congress surely would not
162. Garbus, supra note 141, at 194-95.
163. Id.
164. King, 392 U.S. at 328-30.
165. Id. at 320, 324-35.
166. Id. at 324-25.
167. The year before, in 1967, Congress had enacted amendments to AFDC that
penalized states if they failed to reduce the number of illegitimate children on AFDC.
"Senator Robert Kennedy complained that 'the man-in-the-house rule emerges from
the conference strengthened rather than weakened' and joined with other liberals in
an unsuccessful effort to kill the conference report." Melnick, supra note 73, at 87
(quoting Social Security Amendments of 1967-Conference Report, Congressional
Record, Dec. 14, 1967, p. 36785).
168. King, 392 U.S. at 328.
1860 [Vol. 69
CONSTITUTIONAL WELFARE RIGHTS
have allowed the states] arbitrarily to leave one class of destitute
children entirely without meaningful protection .... Such an
interpretation of congressional intent would be most unreasonable,
and we decline to adopt it."' 69
Relying on King v. Smith, LSO attorneys went on to challenge a
wide variety of state practices. Most Northern states had their own,
less draconian man-in-the-house rules, like New York's, which did not
disqualify the family, but put some financial burden on the man
involved. New York's "lodger" rule reduced the family's AFDC grant
by an amount equal to the man's prorated share of the AFDC housing
allowance."' 0 The lower courts took a hard line against all such
practices, and the Supreme Court upheld them, enshrining a principle
of "actual availability."'' Thus, the much-resented man-in-the-house
rule fell by the wayside, its defeat a victory for the social movement's
vision of autonomy. The federal courts also halted the more general
practice of attributing to AFDC families income from other persons-
adult siblings, grandparents, or others-living with the family, but
under no legal obligation to support it, unless the welfare agency
could prove that such income was "actually available" to the family."
Other forms of presumed income were successfully challenged, and
the upshot was that courts indirectly increased family's benefits.
In the process of expanding their attack on man-in-the-house and
other attributed income rules, the courts strengthened the general
presumption against all types of state-imposed restrictions. Few facets
of AFDC policy escaped scrutiny in the lower courts. State laws
penalizing recipients for fraud; laws and regulations denying benefits
to aliens; rules on verification procedure, foster care, and emergency
assistance-were all struck down.173 Likewise, state determinations of
the standard of need came under review. 74
169. Id. at 330.
170. Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338,340-42 (1975).
171. Melnick, supra note 73, at 88-89. See, e.g., Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552
(1970).
172. Melnick, supra note 73, at 89.
173. See, e.g., Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1977); Maryland v. Mathews,
415 F. Supp. 1206 (D.D.C. 1976); J.A. v. Riti, 377 F. Supp. 1046 (D. NJ. 1974); Owens
v. Roberts, 377 F. Supp. 45 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Cooper v. Laupheimer, 316 F. Supp. 264
(E.D. Pa. 1970).
174. This was a particularly hard judicial row to hoe, for, as we saw, in 1935 FDR
and Congress felt compelled by the Dixiecrats to make such standards a purely local
matter. In 1967, however, LBJ recommended that Congress require the states to
update their standards of needs each year and to pay 100% of those standards.
Congress adopted part of those recommendations, requiring cost-of-living
adjustments and demanding that "any maximums that the State imposes on the
amount of aid paid to families will have been proportionately adjusted." 42 U.S.C. §
602(a)(23) (1994). HEW, for its part, read the amendment in a way that conceded
that states could nullify the cost-of-living adjustment simply by switching to a
"percentage reduction" system, paying only part of each family's needs. See Robert L
Rabin, Implementation of die Cost-of-Living Adjustment for AFDC Recipients: A
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During the first thirty years of AFDC's existence, there had been
but one reported federal case interpreting the statute. Then, between
1968 and 1975, the years Michelman wrote his first seminal pieces on
welfare rights, the Supreme Court decided eighteen AFDC cases, and
the lower federal courts decided hundreds more.17 5 Chiefly through
statutory construction, the federal judiciary had gone a great distance
toward transforming a grant-in-aid to the states into a no-strings, no-
stigma, national right to welfare. But statutory construction could go
but so far. It could not establish a decent social minimum as a floor
on welfare benefits, or even prevent the states from diminishing
payments as they expanded coverage under judicial nudging.'76 And it
could not challenge the exclusions inscribed in the statute's categorical
system, forcing Congress to change the system into one embracing all
of the nation's poor. If courts were to force these changes, it would be
through constitutional adjudication.
At first, LSO relied heavily on constitutional challenges. Residency
requirements, as we saw, carried forward a centuries-old tradition of
localities "warning out" wayfaring paupers. Nine out of eleven lower
courts agreed with welfare rights groups and the LSO that these
requirements trenched on the welfare recipient's "right to travel"; to
be a member of the national community had always included the right
freely to travel among the states. In Shapiro v. Thompson, the
Supreme Court agreed that the states' residency requirements
unconstitutionally burdened poor Americans' enjoyment of that
right. 1Y7 More than that, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court,
Case Study in Welfare Administration, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1143, 1150 (1970). The
NWRO and LSO went to court, arguing that Congress meant that AFDC recipients
must enjoy a real increase in benefits as a result of the mandated adjustments. A
three-judge court in New York agreed. Judge Jack Weinstein concluded that HEW's
narrow reading of the provision "render[ed] the statute virtually meaningless."
Rosado v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 1356, 1378 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). "[Bly encouraging
states to switch to percentage reduction systems," HEW's interpretation of the
amendment "is likely to lead to lower payments." Id. at 1379. The Supreme Court,
however, refused to read the amendment's "ambiguous language" to establish a
national floor for benefit levels. According to Justice Harlan, the provision had more
modest purposes: to "require [the] States to face up realistically to the magnitude of
the public assistance requirement," and "to prod the States to apportion their
payments on a more equitable basis." Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 412-13 (1970).
The upshot as Judge Weinstein had predicted, was that many states responded to
rising AFDC costs by instituting "percentage reduction" systems. Looking back on
Rosado, Edward Sparer concluded that the case was "a disaster. It is one thing to
force a state to raise its standard of need; it is another to prevent a state from
lowering its actual payment level." And this latter goal, Sparer and LSO never
attained. See Sparer, The Right to Welfare, supra note 141, at 79.
175. See generally Lawrence, supra note 141.
176. See Rosado, 397 U.S. at 397, discussed supra at note 174.
177. 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969). On the lower court litigation and rulings against
residency requirements, see Frank S. Bloch, Cooperative Federalism and the Role of
Litigation in the Development of Federal AFDC Eligibility Policy, 1979 Wisc. L. Rev.
1.
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seemed to suggest (Justice Black, in dissent, called it a "cryptic
suggestion" '178) that strict scrutiny, applying the compelling state
interest test to the residency requirement, might be justified for
another reason-not the right to travel, but the fact that welfare
affects "the ability of the families to obtain the very means to
subsist."'79
D. The "New Property": Cultural Resonance, Normative Ambiguity
Likewise, eight lower courts heard LSO challenges to states'
summary termination practices, and six held that the due process
clause required pre-termination hearings. In 1970, with its decision in
Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court upheld the majority view.2
Declaring that welfare benefits were "a matter of statutory
entitlement," whose "termination involves state action that
adjudicates important rights," Goldberg v. Kelly encapsulated the past
five years of federal litigation and decisional law. 8' By recognizing
private rights of action, stripping broad swathes of discretionary
power from local officials, and eliminating non-need based eligibility
criteria, this new body of law had made welfare benefits into just such
rights. The Court seemed to go further, stating more fully and
forcefully than ever before the sociological premises behind the "more
sophisticated and enlightened" view of welfare it had evoked (and
attributed to Congress) in King v. Smith. In a footnote to its assertion
that welfare benefits were "a matter of statutory entitlement," the
Court observed,
It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like
"property" than a "gratuity." Much of the existing wealth in this
country takes the form of rights that do not fall within traditional
common-law concepts of property. It has been aptly noted that
"[s]ociety today is built around entitlement. The automobile dealer
has his franchise, the doctor and lawyer their professional licenses,
the worker his union membership, contract, and pension rights, the
executive his contract and stock options; all are devices to aid
security and independence. Many of the most important of these
entitlements now flow from government: subsidies to farmers and
businessmen, routes for airlines and channels for television
stations ... social security pensions for individuals. Such sources of
security, whether private or public, are no longer regarded as
luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients they are essentials, fully
deserved, and in no sense a form of charity. It is only the poor
178. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 661(Black, J. dissenting).
179. Id. at 627.
180. See Bloch, supra note 177; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
181. 397 U.S. at 262.
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whose entitlements, although recognized by public policy, have not
been effectively enforced."'"
The long quotation was from one of Charles Reich's two
enormously influential articles on the "new property," published in
Yale Law Journal in 1964-65.183 It is an argument about the status of
welfare in an era in which "government largess" takes myriad forms
and constitutes so much of individual and corporate wealth. In
Reich's account, the welfare recipient belonged to a whole social
order of Americans "liv[ing] on government largess."'" "Social
insurance substitutes for savings; [and] a government contract replaces
a businessman's customers and goodwill,"1" while in between the new
pauper and pensioner and the new businessmen stood petty
entrepreneurs and tradesmen, the cab driver dependent on his
medallion, the tavern keeper and the hunting guide whose livelihoods
hinged on their licenses.186 In Reich's anxious and nostalgic liberal
narrative of American life, political and cultural antagonists-the cab
driver or tradesman and the welfare mother, the factory owner and
the union worker-were united by their common vulnerability to the
state.Y v In fact, precious few of Reich's disparate forms of "new
property" were new.18 But the assimilation of pauper to tradesman
and franchise-holder, the equation of welfare benefits with
professional licenses and government contracts, were dramatically
new, and this equation did the important discursive and doctrinal
work. The "new property" unlike the old was "dispensed by the
state... in the form of rights or status rather than tangible goods."'' 9
How, then, Reich asked, can the new property fulfill the "social
function of the old property"? How can it serve as an "institution that
secures the individual a measure of independence from state
domination," when it "is itself dispensed by the state"?", The
question sounded in classical liberalism, and so did the answer. If
government subsidies, contracts, pensions, and benefits were to serve
as a basis for private autonomy and dignified existence, fulfilling the
"social function of property," then these various forms of "largess"
182 Id. at 262 n.8 (quoting Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The
Emerging Legal Issues, infra note 183, at 1255).
183. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964); Charles A.
Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 Yale L.J.
1245 (1965) [hereinafter Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare].
184. Reich, The New Property, supra note 182, at 733.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 758.
187. Agency discretion wielded "life and death power" over the livelihoods of one
and all. See id.
188. See William J. Novak, The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in
Nineteenth Century America (1996).
189. See Reich, The New Property, supra note 183, at 738.
190. See id.
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must enjoy the same legal protections as traditional common-law
forms of property.
In particular, the new property, like the old, must be protected
against arbitrary deprivations and invasions by the state. What the
state gave, the state could not take away-at least not without due
process. And, in fact, Reich observed, due process case law already
had begun in the 1950s to establish that the state could not take away
such government-granted goods as an occupational license without a
"hearing and standards of fairness."'91 Where the "freedom to earn a
living" was implicated, courts recognized that procedural due process'
protections of property applied. But welfare too involved livelihood;
like traditional livelihoods, it had the potential to provide "a secure
minimum basis for individual well-being and dignity."'" But only if
the legal order recognized it too as a form of property.
For all its resonance, Reich's argument left many questions
dangling; and so did Goldberg v. Kelly. First, was the question of
distributive justice. Conceding that welfare benefits, if recognized as
secure legal entitlements, could perform the "social functions" Reich
and the Court claimed for them, why were the poor entitled to them?
On what distributive premise did they rest? On the face of it, welfare
was not a moral equivalent to a professional license or a pension right
in a union contract or even to government-based social insurance.
One earned one's license, one exchanged one's labor for one's union
contract, and one made monthly contributions to one's social
insurance. Effort and exchange were the ordinary normative bases in
liberal legal culture for such "property" claims. What was the
normative argument that made welfare a cognate right, when on the
face of it, welfare differed from the others by distributing goods with
neither effort nor exchange to underpin the result? 9 1
Second was the question of whether the legal/constitutional order's
"recognition" of welfare as a right had only formal and procedural
bite. If the social function of welfare as "property" was to provide "a
secure minimum basis for individual well-being and dignity," then did
the "entitlement" not entail a measure of substantive constitutional
protection-say, against lawmakers' deciding to repeal the
entitlement or to diminish it below the "minimum"? Or was that kind
of recognition of the property-like aspect of welfare strictly a matter
of public policy for legislatures to determine?
For Reich the right to welfare seemed to rest on the involuntary
nature of individual poverty. "Today," he wrote in the full text of the
passage from which the Goldberg Court quoted:
191. Id at 741.
192. Id. at 786.
193. This point is William Simon's. See Simon, Rights and Redistribution in tie
Welfare System, supra note 145.
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we see poverty as the consequence of large impersonal forces in a
complex industrial society... [Past eras saw poverty as flowing from
individual "idleness" and other moral failings.] It is closer to the
truth to say that the poor are affirmative contributors to today's
society, for we are so organized as virtually to compel this sacrifice
by a segment of the population. Since the enactment of the Social
Security Act, we have recognized that they have a right-not a mere
privilege-to a minimal share in the commonwealth.' 94
As an assertion about the commitments inscribed in the nation's
statutes, this is bunk.195 As moral reasoning, it also is somewhat odd.
We may view compelled sacrifices as affirmative contributions to the
commonwealth, but these tend to involve some measure of individual
action-say, the sacrifices endured as a conscript in a national army.
What Reich describes here is more like a casualty loss from the
accident of poverty-or rather the accidental loss of a livelihood
because American society is "so organized as virtually to compel"
one's exclusion from the labor market. This would point toward
welfare as a kind of just compensation.
Of course, the compensation clause is not where the Court looked
for constitutional footing. "From its founding the Nation's basic
commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all
persons within its borders. We have come to recognize that forces not
within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty,"' 96 the
Court observed, citing and paraphrasing Reich.
Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help
bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are
available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the
community .... Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a
means to "promote the general Welfare and secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity. '' 97
So, the Court did not follow Reich in his blunt assertion that
welfare was the poor person's just desert as a conscript in the reserve
army of the unemployed. It did suggest that because supra-individual,
social forces "contribute" to a person's poverty, welfare should be
dignifying and not degrading. Reich's bleak quid pro quo rubbed
abrasively against the ideal of equal opportunity. That ideal signified
bringing the nation's poor into a shared world of work and
opportunity, not compensating them for permanent exclusion from it.
194. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare, supra note 183, at 1255.
195. As we have seen, the Social Security Act recognized no such right; it provided
time-limited unemployment insurance and old-age pensions to those who contributed,
mothers' pensions and public assistance for the blind and the elderly poor - those who
could not presently or could no longer be expected to work, and nothing at all for the
idle poor. See supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
196. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,265 (1970).
197. Id. at 265.
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So, the Court cast welfare not as compensation for the jobless poor's
involuntary "contribution" to the economy, but as a means of bringing
within their reach "opportunities... to participate.., in the life of the
community." Presumably, this meant that without means of
subsistence, the poor could not begin to attain education and decent
work or to participate in civic life. Participating in these spheres-not
welfare as such-is the social basis of equal citizenship, which is why
welfare was more the fruit of the New Deal's failure to enact social
citizenship than its fulfillment. But by casting welfare provision, in the
words of the Preamble, as a step toward including all Americans in a
common framework of "Liberty" and "the general Welfare," the
Court seemed to confirm that welfare had constitutional significance.
Later the same term, in Dandridge v. Williams,"s the Court made
plain that generous, justice-seeking statutory constructions and formal
and procedural protections were as far as it would go in "promoting
the general Welfare" with welfare rights:
The intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems
presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business
of this Court. The Constitution may impose certain procedural
safeguards upon systems of welfare administration. But the
Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state
officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocatinglimited
public welfare funds among the myriad potential recipients."
V. MICHELMAN'S CONSTITUTIONAL WAR ON POVERTY
A. "Minimum Protection, " "Just Wants," and "Basic Needs"
Dandridge lay ahead as Frank Michelman set to work on the
unfinished normative underpinnings of constitutional welfare rights.
The federal courts had labored mightily in statutory AFDC cases to
make need the sole criterion for eligibility. Justice Brennan, in
Shapiro, even had intimated that need of families for the very means
of subsistence might become a member of the new constitutional
family of fundamental interests, and thereby subject classifications in
and exclusions from welfare statutes to strict scrutiny.: ' But need had
never stood on the same plane as effort or exchange in the distributive
norms of common law or constitutional doctrine. Need needed an
argument that sounded in distributive justice. Charles Reich's articles
did not provide one.201  Reich urged courts to attack official
198. 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding state AFDC regulation setting ceiling on
AFDC grant regardless of family size under rational relation standard of equal
protection review).
199. Id. at 490.
200. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,638 (1968).
201. The text oversimplifies. Reich, as we saw, did gesture toward a justificatory
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arbitrariness and discretion, and the insecurity and indignities they
bred. He offered a sociological rationale for treating statutory welfare
benefits as rights, but no moral or constitutional argument why courts
were obliged to provide for the needy whom lawmakers had left out,
or to remedy the shortfalls between statutory offerings and actual
need. From the point of view of a legal scholar who sympathized with
the welfare rights movement, the need-based right still needed
arguments that extended beyond procedural to distributive justice and
addressed the right's substantive reach and bounds.
Michelman set out in search of such arguments. He reported on his
progress in two pioneering articles, On Protecting the Poor Through
the Fourteenth Amendment,2" Michelman's 1969 Harvard Foreword,
which Lessig lit on as if in a different and distant world, and his 1973
In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls'
Theory of Justice. °3 Protecting the Poor was an effort to nudge
doctrine and doctrinal scholarship toward a theory of judicially
enforceable constitutional welfare rights. In Pursuit of Constitutional
Welfare Rights was a reading of John Rawls' epoch-making book,2"'
examining how Rawls' theory bore on the idea of justiciable welfare
rights, and how such an examination, in turn, might illuminate Rawls'
theory.
"What," asked Michelman, is "the role of courts" in "the great
War" on poverty? 5 He answered with a reading of a handful of
recent equal protection decisions-Shapiro,2 6 which had been decided
in the 1968 term, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,2" Douglas v.
California,"' and a few of their kin. Michelman dubbed these cases
the Court's "contribution to the great War.""2 9 Shapiro, Harper, and
Douglas all could be read as resting, partly, on a notion of wealth
discrimination. 10 Many lower courts' and liberal commentators
argument based on exchange: welfare was just compensation for society's more or less
conscious choice of a political economy that offered too few decently paid jobs to go
around.
202. Michelman, Protecting the Poor, supra note 11, at 7.
203. Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of
Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 962 (1973) [hereinafter Michelman, In
Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights].
204. John Rawls, A Theory Of Justice (1971).
205. See Michelman, Protecting the Poor, supra note 11, at 8-9.
206. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968).
207. 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding that the state may not condition franchise on
payment of tax or fee).
208. 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding that the state must provide counsel to criminal
accused on first appeal as of right, irrespective of court's assessment of probable
merits).
209. See Michelman, Protecting the Poor, supra note 11, at 9.
210. Harper spoke of the "traditional disfavor" with which the Court regarded
statutes discriminating on the basis of "wealth, like race," 383 U.S. at 668, Douglas of
"that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man...
enjoys the benefit of counsel's [assistance] ... while the indigent ... is forced to shift
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wishfully read them as signs that the Court might bring the nation's
poor into the "inner circle" of judicially protected classes.212
For his part, Michelman read the decisions differently. The Court,
he agreed, was embarking on "the elaboration of constitutional rights
pertaining to the status of being poor,"213 and it had clothed the
decisions presaging these rights in the "verbiage of inequality and
discrimination. 214 But the inchoate "theory of social justice ... at the
roots" of these cases was ill expressed in the language of "equality or
evenhandedness. 215  Applying strict scrutiny to laws that fall
unequally on the nation's poor would sweep too broadly; such
government action is everywhere. Nor does equality offer a plausible
benchmark for answering the question how much protection is
"enough." "'As much as' seems to provide just the certainty of
measure which 'enough of' so sorely lacks."21  But would a court be
comfortable explaining "why X is entitled to, say," as much legal
assistance on his appeal as "Y in fact has rather than what justice
requires?" ' If equal protection, as applied to the plight of poverty,
for himself... [T]he evil [in such a situation] is... discrimination against the
indigent." 372 U.S. at 358. "[A]n unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich
and poor." Id at 357. In his Shapiro dissent Justice Harlan lamented the majority's
"cryptic suggestion" that welfare constituted a "fundamental interest" giving rise to
the strict scrutiny/compelling state interest test the Court's emergent equal protection
doctrine had begun to extend from suspect racial classifications to other invidious
discriminations and fundamental constitutional interests nowhere evident in the
constitutional text. 394 U.S. at 661.
211. Thus, the same year as Michelman's Foreword, see supra note 11, a three-
judge district court in New York enjoined a recent change in the state's welfare
regulations, which reduced public assistance payments in counties surrounding New
York City to levels below those paid to city residents, when previously they had been
grouped together. Rothstein v. Wyman 303 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Applying
strict scrutiny to the new classifying scheme, the district court wrote, "[receipt of
welfare benefits may not at the present time constitute the exercise of a constitutional
right"; nonetheless, the court deemed controlling the teaching Harper and Shapiro,
that classifications creating "inequalities affecting the exercise of fundamental or
critical personal rights" must be scrutinized under "a more stringent standard." Id. at
346. As in Harper and Shapiro, so here the court found a conjunction of a
"fundamental right" and a "disadvantaged minority": only here the right wvas welfare
and the minority, the poor. While welfare was only an incipient constitutional right,
an emergent fundamental interest, Shapiro still seemed to mark the Court's
acknowledgment that "[a]ccess to [the] bare necessities of life" was as "fundamental"
as voting. Id. at 346-48. And Douglas marked a dawning recognition of the poor as a
protected minority. Id
212. See John E. Coons et al., Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional
Test for State Financial Structures, 57 Cal. L. Rev. 305, 365 (1969). See generally
Arthur J. Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U. L Rev. 205
(1964); Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Erclusionary Zoning, Equal
Protection, and the Indigent, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 767 (1969).
213. See Michelman, Protecting the Poor, supra note 11, at 16.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 10.
216. Id. at 18.
217. Id.
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swept too broadly, it also stopped short of the mark, because equal
protection implies "a state action qualification upon government's
duties to relieve against hazards of poverty." 18 Yet, it was "less easy
to be reconciled to the 'state action' notion when alleviation of
certain, specially poignant hardships or crushing disadvantages is
thought to be the object. [Then,] the government's
noninvolvement... may come not as relief but as reproach. '219
Thus, while inequality and discrimination were the doctrinal notions
near at hand, they were misleading. The upsetting feature in the
equal protection cases involving poverty was not some odious
discrimination that might accompany a poor person's deprivation of a
good he couldn't afford; what was disturbing was the deprivation
itself. So, Michelman sought to use the cases as data points from
which to infer the outlines of a constitutional universe of "just wants"
or "basic needs." Not equal protection, he insisted, but "minimum
protection" was the heart of the matter.220  Focusing on specific
deprivations of basic needs was "a much more manageable task" for
courts. Michelman strapped himself to the mast of moderation, and
vowed to keep "resolutely deaf" to the Court's superfluous equality
rhetoric.2" His was a more modest picture of the courts' part in
ending poverty: "[not] railing against tides of economic inequality
which they" can't stem, but "busy with the critically important task of
charting some islands of haven from economic disaster in the ocean of
(what continues to be known as) free enterprise."''
Apart from how modest or vaulting a vision of the courts' role this
actually was, one could question how well it rendered the values and
visions afoot in the cases. Especially in light of subsequent cases like
Dandridge v. Williams,' decided during the next term, it seems fairly
clear that most of the justices in the Shapiro, Harper, and Douglas
majorities harbored no "minimum protectionist" vision. They would
make welfare an enforceable statutory right and interpret it broadly;
they would not make it a constitutional right-except in its procedural
dimensions (again, the next term in Goldberg). They would not
compel states or Congress to make up any shortfall between statutory
offerings and the real world of "brutal need," nor etch out a
constitutional universe of just wants, nor subject state laws or
practices that fell heavily or arbitrarily on the poor to any exacting
constitutional standard. Not unless there were some other, more
familiar constitutional value entwined in the case: the fairness of the
218. Id. at 11.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 13-14.
221. Id. at 33.
222. Id.
223. 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding state AFDC regulation setting ceiling on
AFDC grant regardless of family size under rational relation standard of equal
protection review).
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criminal process, ending the South's disenfranchisement of blacks and
poor whites, vindicating the citizen's right to travel among the states
of the Union free from discrimination.
Indeed, the idea that "lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not
luxuries"'  harked back to the 1930s and Powell v. Alabama ; it
spoke to the Court's special solicitude for the integrity of the judicial
process and its sensitivity toward the charge that "the rich man can
require the court to listen to argument of counsel before deciding on
the merits, but a poor man cannot."' 6  Harper, striking down
Virginia's poll tax, seems likely to have been a kin to Powell in most
justices' minds. They more likely saw themselves completing the
dismantling of Jim Crow, than identifying the first "islands of
[economic] haven" on a constitutional map of basic needs and just
wants.
What is important for us about Protecting the Poor, however, is not
its failed prophecy about doctrinal developments, but its optimism
about the open-ended quality of those developments and its
identification of courts and author with the "great War" on poverty.
Indeed, Protecting the Poor was a product of the "great War" in a
material as well as a moral sense; we learn in its acknowledgments
that the article "was prepared ... with funds provided by The U.S.
Office of Economic Opportunity."-' While he worked on it,
Michelman was associated with The Harvard Center on Law and
Education.' An LSO back-up center, like CSWPL at Columbia, the
Harvard Center litigated special education and school desegregation
cases. It saw itself, much as the CSWPL did, battling against the
intertwined evils of racism and poverty. Like the CSWPL, the
Harvard Center trained scores of LSO attorneys and worked with
community organizations, although it lacked some of CSWPL's and
Sparer's "movement" tilt, and had nothing quite like their close ties
with the NWRO. 2
Intellectually, however, Michelman joined the NWRO and the
attorneys and policy mavens surrounding it in their sharp break with
inherited rights discourse. In contrast with the NWRO, Protecting the
Poor and In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights do not defend a
guaranteed income but instead a bundle of "insurance rights" (to
224. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding indigent felony
defendants entitled to state-funded trial counsel under the Sixth Amendment).
225. 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (holding an indigent defendant in capital case entitled to
state-financed counsel under the Sixth Amendment).
226. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (holding that the state must
provide counsel to criminal accused on first appeal as of right, irrespective of court's
assessment of probable merits).
227. Michelman, Protecting the Poor, supra note 11, at 7 n.*.
228. See id
229. See generally Marion Wright Edelman, Lanterns: A Memoir of Mentors
(1999). Edelman was a director of the Harvard Center on Law and Education.
2001] 1871
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
food, shelter, health care, education). But in common with the
NWRO, Michelman breaks the link with work. His constitutional
welfare rights are unconditional. Thus, with the NWRO, Michelman
rejects the centuries-old distinctions between "worthy" and
"unworthy" candidates for public provision. There are no distinctions
here between the disabled and able-bodied, the ill-fated and
blameworthy, the widowed and promiscuous, the earnest job-seeker
and the shiftless and idle. 11 Instead, Michelman means to summon
forth a theory of distributive justice that is insistently unsatisfied by a
political economy affording "every one a fair opportunity" -through
"full employment," "income transfers," and the like-to provide for
everyone's basic needs or just wants. Protecting the Poor requires
"more"; it requires basic needs or just wants "will be met when and as
felt, [regardless of] ... effort, thrift, or foresight."' 1
Michelman does not dispute that justice requires the kind of
political economy that enables everyone to make a decent living
through decent work. At one point, he even notes that a participant
in a Rawlsian assembly might well seek-in addition, and perhaps
even prior to, insurance rights-assurance of some of social
citizenship's mainstays in the form of full employment, income
supplements and the like. 2  But apart from this passing observation,
work in all its forms-waged and unwaged, dignifying and demeaning,
decently rewarded and socially valued and not-does not figure at all
in Michelman's account of the constitutional dimensions of the "great
War" on poverty. 3 In this, of course, Michelman departs from the
social citizenship tradition. It sought to find or include these norms in
the Constitution-to serve, in much the same terms that Michelman
applies to welfare rights, as touchstones for "convincing advocacy"
and "foothold[s] for challenging legislative judgments" that fell short
of assuring decent work opportunities and decent livelihoods for all.2 4
230. Michelman welcomes the challenge-to answer the "compelling... objection
to welfare rights, that such rights signify redistribution from the prudent and
industrious to those who have culpably failed to grasp opportunities to provide for
their own security." Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights, supra
note 203, at 969.
231. Michelman, Protecting the Poor, supra note 11, at 14.
232. Id. at 15 n.21.
233. One might think that such social citizenship principles as a right to work are
absent from Michelman's constitutional theorizing, because they lie beyond anything
courts could hope to contribute to the anti-poverty campaign. But it seems fair to say
that for the Michelman of these two essays, "minimum protection" constitutes the full
reach of the Constitution's-and not merely the constitutional courts'-"protection of
the poor." No Constitution seen from the vantage point of civil society or of
Congress would contain any different rights or equality norms. As we'll see, infra
note 267, Michelman does address constitutional advocacy in political fora, and he
casts the social minimum for constituting equal citizenship in the same mold.
234. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights, supra note 203, at
1002-03.
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This lacuna results in an argument for welfare rights that assigns
those rights social work they cannot do; they cannot secure the social
bases of self respect and mutual respect in American life. Or so I will
suggest. But I will do so in the context of a critical reading of
Michelman's reading of Rawls, to which we must turn.
B. A Critical Reading of Michelman on Rawls
What was afoot in the courts shaped the way Michelman
approached Rawls' A Theory of Justice.--5 When Michelman turned in
earnest to Rawls, he did so with a mind to asking
[h]ow... the book [bore] upon the work of legal investigators
concerned or curious about recognition, through legal processes, of
claimed affirmative rights (let us call them "welfare rights") to
education, shelter, subsistence, health care and the like, or to the
money these things cost.23 6
The answer was a vexed one. Michelman rested welfare rights on a
distributive principle of "minimum protection" or "just wants." Rawls
offered something different. The chief basis for welfare rights or for
"the money these things cost" in A Theory of Justice was Rawls'
difference principle.
The difference principle, you'll recall, states that institutionalized
inequalities must be justified by dint of being in the interests of the
least advantaged.37 Inequalities that do not redound to the benefit of
those at the bottom are illegitimate. For Rawls, this principle is not
cashed out through income standards or transfer payments alone; it
must imbue the general "organization of the economy," and the
distribution of wealth, power and authority as well as income.' 3
Because his focus rests on welfare, however, Michelman reads the
difference principle with an eye to income. "Even apart from the
quest for justiciability," he writes (and we will return to that quest),
"the difference principle is unsatisfactory;"" 9 for Rawls seems
interested simply in maximizing the income of those at the bottom,
irrespective of whether that income is adequate to meeting basic
needs,2' or whether it substantially exceeds that level."4' Moreover,
235. See Rawls, supra note 204.
236. Michelman, In Pursudt of Constitutional Welfare Rights, supra note 203, at 962.
237. See Rawls, supra note 204, at 100-01. See also John Rawls, Political Liberalism
283 (1996) (Michelman explicates and criticizes the difference principle in In Pursuit
of Constitutional Welfare Rights, supra note 203, at 976-88.)
238. See Rawls, supra note 204, at 7-11, 54.
239. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights, supra note 203, at 982.
240. "A precept for the distribution of material social goods," writes Michelman,
"which ignores claims regarding basic needs as such, and is sensitive only to claims
regarding money income, will for many of us seem incomplete and thus not fully in
harmony with our 'considered judgments."' Id.
241. Michelman states:
Income-transfer activity is simply to be intensified just up to the point where
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Michelman finds it difficult to feed the "primary good of self-respect"
into the machinery of the difference principle, because the good of
self-respect "does not seem to fit the difference principle's 'more is
better' attitude."242  Yet, from the point of view of liberal
constitutional theory, the centrality of self-respect and equal respect
in Rawls' theory are an important part of his appeal.
Michelman does find some support for a just wants/insurance rights
approach to welfare elsewhere in Rawls' theory. While the difference
principle is uncongenial, it is possible that Rawls' equal liberty
principle or his principle of fair equality of opportunity, or even
"justice as fairness" as a whole, implies a bundle of "insurance rights"
such as Michelman is championing.243 Mainly, however, Michelman
focuses on explicating and assessing the difference principle as a
source of welfare rights.
Unlike the "'more is better' attitude" of Rawls' difference principle,
Michelman's "just wants" theory provides a touchstone for
determining the metes and bounds of welfare provision that seems
directly tied to equal respect. 244 Beyond the point at which welfare
provides a decent minimum of social goods, it seems wiser to allow
considerations of economic incentives and market efficiency to hold
sway. As a rational actor behind Rawls' "veil of ignorance," one
might well prefer assurance that one's "just wants" be satisfied, and
for the rest one might prefer to wager that one's individual capacities
were at least middling as the market measures things-and choose
against the "more is better" attitude of the difference principle.
Certainly, Michelman makes a valuable point about the
vulnerability of the difference principle from the point of view of
any further intensification lowers total output so much that the bottom's
absolute income begins to fall even as its relative share of total consumer
satisfaction continues to rise. Under the difference principle, that is all there
is to it. There can be no implicit insurance-rights package because there is
no concern for what the bottom spends (or is able to spend) its income on.
Income is income-a primary, an elemental, social good, of which the
bottom simply wants and is entitled to as much as it can get.
Id. at 981.
24Z Id. at 983.
243. After all, fair equality of opportunity implies a right to education, and that
right entails "subsistence or health or freedom from extreme environmental
deprivation," for without them, "how could educational offerings effectuate fair
equality of opportunity?" Id. at 989. So too, the "[e]njoyment of basic liberties" like
freedom of speech has "fairly straightforward and objective biological entailments,"
which spell subsistence and the other insurance rights. Id. Finally, the "preeminent
good of self-respect may imply welfare rights reaching beyond those biological
entailments," although Michelman does not explore how. Id. at 990.
244. Michelman may have been the first sympathetic critic of Rawls to suggest that
the difference principle and the income guarantee it entailed were not the only nor
the most compelling principle that could be derived from Rawls' original position. Ajust wants principle might fit the bill better. For a thoughtful and nuanced later
reading, making the case for a just wants approach, see Jeremy Waldron, Liberal
Rights 225-49 (1993).
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calibrating welfare rights or a minimum income. However, we risk
being misled if we look at the difference principle only from this
perspective. From it, we might surmise that what separates Rawls'
views about social and economic rights from Michelman's is simply a
quarrel over what form of income redistribution to enshrine in the
Constitution-minimum income pegged to the difference principle, or
minimum welfare rights pegged to just wants. In fact, neither of these
alternatives captures Rawls' view of how the principles of justice,
including the difference principle, bear on constitutional political
economy. Rawls devotes great attention in A Theory of Justice to just
this subject; what he writes makes plain, I think, that he would include
constitutional baselines respecting work and participation in the
economic order, as well as welfare.
Despite the tension he uncovers between the primary good of self
respect and the "more is better" attitude of the difference principle
applied to income, Michelman is right in suggesting that the difference
principle is concerned with the social bases of self respect and mutual
respect. Indeed, it concerns them more than it does the rational
actor's calculus of consent regarding income shares. When Rawls
writes about consent, he is concerned about what it takes to make
each person a consenting member-a "charter member" in Jeremy
Waldron's apt phrase-of society. He is concerned not only, or even
primarily, wvith rational choice, but with contract, undertaking and
commitment 45-more precisely, with consent and commitment to the
social enterprise, and, conversely, with the conditions which turn
consent and commitment into submission and subjection. This is the
problem Rawls dubs the "strains of commitment."2 Under an unjust
political economy, such as ours, there are millions of citizens who
cannot plausibly see themselves as members of a political community
organized in their name to promote their interests and capacities.
Instead of supporting their capacities for commitment we have
strained them to a breaking point.
What, then, are the political-economic bases of consent and
commitment? More important, writes Rawls, than "a high material
standard of life" in securing "a just and good society ... is meaningful
work in free association with others, these associations regulating
their relations to one another within a framework of just basic
institutions." 247 That is why, as you will recall, the difference principle
reaches beyond income to the distribution of wealth and power; it
245. Rawls, supra note 204, at 176 ("[W]hen we enter an agreement we must be
able to honor it even should the worst possibilities prove to be the case .... Thus the
parties must weigh with care whether they will be able to stick by their commitment in
all circumstances.")
246. Id. at 145, 176, 423. I am indebted to Waldron's discussion of this theme in
Rawls. See Waldron, supra note 244, at 259-67.
247. Waldron, supra note 244, at 290.
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concerns shared authority no less than a fair share of goods. This is
the key difference between Rawls' constitutional political economy-
which he dubs a "property-owning democracy"-and the political
economy of the welfare state. "In a welfare state," he writes in a 1987
preface to A Theory of Justice, "the aim [of political institutions] is
that none should fall below a decent standard of life .... By contrast,
in a property-owning democracy the aim is to carry out the idea of
society as a fair system of cooperation over time between citizens as
free and equal persons."248 The "background institutions of property-
owning democracy... try to disperse the ownership of wealth and
capital, and thus to prevent a small part of society from controlling the
economy and indirectly political life itself."249 The idea is "not simply
to assist those who lose out through accident or misfortune (although
this must be done), but instead to put all citizens in a position to
manage their own affairs and to take part in social cooperation on a
footing of mutual respect."50
In brief, Rawls' precepts for political economy fall squarely within
the social citizenship tradition. His political economy of citizenship
bears a strong family resemblance to the Populists, Progressives and
New Dealers we've canvassed. Like them, he holds that one cannot
be a consenting, charter member, a "citizen," of the national
community without decent work, a measure of economic
independence, and at least a small share of authority over the
governance of one's work and shared economic life.
Whether one rests one's normative claim for welfare rights on some
variant of Rawlsian liberalism, as Michelman does in the work we
have been considering, or one relies on the republican tradition, as he
does in the essays we take up later, a key part of the argument for
welfare rights is this. These rights are necessary to secure the social
bases of self-respect (the main concern in Rawls) and of independence
and mutual respect or equal standing (republicanism's primary
emphasis). In sum, welfare rights are necessary to a liberal republican
(or if you prefer a republican liberal) conception of equal citizenship.
Yet, plainly Rawls would insist that the social bases of equal
citizenship consist of more than a decent minimum of food, shelter,
and other material goods. They also demand a right to earn a
livelihood through decent work; they require an opportunity to
contribute in some recognized fashion to the social enterprise. This
broader view of the material dimensions of constitutional equality is
not only Rawls'; it also has a better mooring in the empirical literature
that treats the social and economic underpinnings of self-respect 25'
248. John Rawls, Collected Papers 419 (1999).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 78; Arthur H. Goldsmith et al., The Psychological
Impact of Unemployment and Joblessness, 25 J. Soc.-Econ. 333 (1996); Amartya Sen,
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and mutual respect 2 2 among women and men in today's America-
and a better mooring in our constitutional history.
C. Justiciability as a Concern for Judicial Competence and Legitimacy
The family resemblance we found between Rawls and earlier
proponents of social citizenship is one that critics like Sandel
studiously smudge over, in order to claim that Rawls has abandoned
the "formative project" of developing good citizens.2- 3 Michelman is
as careful and generous a reader as dwells in the republic of letters; he
does not smudge over these aspects of Rawls' political economy, but
openly puts them aside to carry on with "minimum protection" and
constitutional welfare rights. Probably Michelman would have
invoked justiciability as reason enough to have put other social
citizenship norms to one side, both in reading Rawls and in his own
constitutional theorizing. "Justiciability," indeed, was Michelman's
reason for seeking insurance rights, even though he conceded that it
was "easier and more natural" to find in Rawls a right to a
"guaranteed money income" or, more generally, a "right... against
excessive or unnecessary inequality of wealth or income."'
'z
Justiciability has two dimensions here. The first concerns institutional
capacity, or "judicial competence" in legal process-ese. The second
concerns the degree to which a given norm is formally law-like,
determinate, and objective in its application. This dimension of
justiciablity obtains whether the setting is the courtroom, the
legislature, or the constitutional convention, when "constitutional
amendment is the chosen avenue of reform.
' '225
The Penalties of Unemployment (Banca D'Italia, Working Paper No. 307, 1997).
252. Of course, complex patterns of respect, deference, and degradation form
around class and occupational hierarchies, but all the empirical literature suggests
that the most salient border between minimum respect and degradation in today's
class structure falls along the line between those who are recognized by organized
society as working and providing a decent living for themselves and their families, and
those men and women at the bottom of the nation's class hierarchy who are not. See,
e.g., Joel F. Handler & Yeheskel Hasenfeld, We, the Poor People: Work, Poverty, and
Welfare (1997); Catherine S. Newman, No Shame in My Game: The Working Poor in
the Inner City (1999). On the experience of women in regard to the identities of
housewife and "[waged] working woman" and the dilemmas of self-respect and social
recognition as a full and equal member of American society, see Vicki Schultz, Life's
Work, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1881 (2000) (arguing that for women no less than men, the
right to participate in decent work is indispensable to equal citizenship; canvassing
empirical literature showing that "a robust conception of equality [for women] can be
best achieved through paid work, rather than despite it." Id. at 1883).
253. Michael Sandel, Democracy's Discontent 6 (1996). See also Michael Sandel,
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982). Cf. Rawls, supra note 204, at 259 (Not
only their capacity for self-respect but more broadly "the sort of persons [citizens]
want to be as well as the sort of persons they are" are shaped by the political economy
they live under.).
254. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights, supra note 203, at 966.
255. Id. at 967.
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Regarding judicial competence, surely the short answer is,
"compared to what?" Is a right to decent work really any more (or
less) beyond judicial capacities or more insulting to separation of
powers constraints than the rights to welfare, health care, and decent
housing with which Michelman conjures? With the former as with the
latter, a number of competency and separation of powers concerns
arise, and a variety of judicial strategies are open.
The concerns and the strategies are familiar, and Michelman briefly
surveys several.56 "[P]erplexing questions of economic feasibility"
may arise; a decree fulfilling a "claimed housing [or employment]
right" might "leav[e] the bottom worse off, on the whole, than it now
is."" But, says Michelman, such questions "do not seem different in
essence from other issues that courts have deemed judicially
triable.""8 And in respect of housing and school finance, and hosts of
other matters, judicial experience with complex litigation-and
attendant forms of fact-finding-has grown since 1973. "More
plausible is the notion of remedial incompetence."' 9 Courts have no
way of enforcing such rights without the raising and appropriating of
public funds and the creation of new administrative structures. Such
actions are not only under the control of the other branches, but also
"involves a complex of subsidiary but vitally important choices which
the judiciary lacks all basis for making.' '2 °  One response to this
problem is "a judicial mandate to legislative, executive, or
administrative officers to prepare, submit, and carry out a corrective
plan." 261
Separation of powers presents a different order of concern. Here,
Rawlsian principles, on Michelman's account, may collide. Judicial
vindication of substantive welfare rights may come at too high a cost
"in participatory inequality [as between the judiciary's and the
citizenry's respective roles in identifying the social rights to which a
society's shared principles of justice commit it] which damages [the
citizen's] self-respect. '262  The trade-off between "justice in
participatory rights" and "justice in substantive rights," may demand
judicial forbearance. Or at least, it may demand that courts "not cut
welfare rights out of the whole cloth of speculative moral theory."263
256. See id. at 1004-10.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1006.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. Indeed, the plausibility of such an "action-forcing" remedial approach to a
proposed right to decent work has recently been defended. See Mark Tushnet, What is
Constitutional about Progressive Constitutionalism?, 4 Widener L. Symp. J. 19, 31
(1999) ("Although judicial enforcement would not guarantee that everyone has a
decent job, enforcement [of an order that the legislature offers plans for relief] could
guarantee that legislatures make jobs policy a high or higher priority.").
262. Id. at 1010.
263. Id.
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But such judgments do not exhaust the question of whether judges
should ever allow such a theory to inform their application of "due
process and equal protection guaranties in their formal and non-
substantive aspects" to statutory materials. Here Michelman takes
inspiration from the lower federal courts' pre-Dandridge readiness to
find in equal protection a command to invalidate even seemingly
plausible classifications among potential eligibles6' and generally to
put the statutory programs' limitations and qualifications under strain,
in the name of making need alone the valid criterion. Too, he finds in
cases like King v. Smith studies of how courts can find in AFDC and
kindred legislation statutory rights that amounted to "justice-inspired
[legislative] supplementation of the constitutional catalogue."2'65
Certainly, this is a credible way to interpret the Court's reading of
Congress' intent against the grain of legislative history and of
Congress' knowing acquiescence in state practices the Court went on
to condemn. Unprepared to declare the existence of such a
constitutional right (and so openly and irrevocably to constrain
Congress), the Court nonetheless was prepared to expand and deepen
the limited and qualified commitments Congress had made.
Not only is this a plausible reconstruction of the interaction
between Court and Congress, but it is suggestive of how a judiciary
mindful of the constitutional dimensions of work and participation
could read statutory material in the area of labor and employment 2
In the case of statutory work and employment rights, however, a court
would not need to rely on "enlightened" contemporary notions of
democracy and justice. Nudging state or federal agencies to construe
their congressional mandates in ways that leaned toward inclusion or
actual availability of work opportunities, courts could proceed in a
somewhat more conservative interpretative style, relying on old, not
emerging or "enlightened," understandings of equal rights and
constitutional equality.
D. Justiciability as Mechanical Applicability
In Search of Constitutional Welfare Rights holds that welfare rights
are the best vocabulary for expressing a constitutional commitment to
a social minimum, partly because of their supposedly greater crispness
and formal, determinate judicial applicability. Donning the hat of
counselor to hypothetical Constitution-framers, and considering the
problem from the point of view of advocacy outside the courts,
Michelman invokes the same criterion. If you want to lay a basis for
"convincing [constitutional] advocacy in political forums," then state
264. See i. at 1011-12.
265. Id- at 1011.
266. For a like-minded account of possible readings of the Wagner Act, see Mark
Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol and Workplace
Co-operation, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1379 (1993).
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your commitment to a social minimum in the form of "insurance
rights." To rely on a more Rawlsian vocabulary "would [fail] to
give.., advocates any special foothold for challenging legislative
judgments."267
Once more, a pertinent question for us is "compared to what?" Is
the legal-rhetorical foothold supplied by a right to decent housing any
more secure from contending interpretations, than that provided by a
right to decent work?2" We need not belabor the point. Michelman
concedes it in his contribution here.
If we ... compare a social-citizenship conception with a welfare-
right conception of a positive constitutional guarantee in the
economic sphere, we can see that neither sort of conception trumps
the other on the scale of justiciability.2 69
Indeed, the examples Michelman chooses are those we've been
employing. He points to the welfare right found in the present South
African Constitution, "to have access to adequate housing," a welfare
right whose "progressive realization" the state must take "reasonable"
steps "to achieve." And he asks whether such a right registers any
higher on the scale of justiciability "than would a declared duty of the
state to do the best it can to maintain an economy and society in
which everyone who wants it has access to respectable, fulfilling
adequately remunerated work." ' The answer, of course, is no.
The next question is "so what?" Even assuming there are
important differences in the justiciability of various social rights,
should justiciability determine which of those rights to
constitutionalize, when their field of application lies first and foremost
in the realm of public political deliberation and policy-making?
Courts, that is, will not be called on to interpret them except in the
context of antecedent interpretation and enactment by lawmakers.
Once more, Michelman today concedes the point-and, indeed,
makes the counter-argument. If the welfare-right conception has an
edge in respect of "concerns about constitutional-legal form," it is on
the scale of what Michelman now calls "narrowness." '' This is a
267. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights, supra note 203, at
1002-03.
268. In fairness, we should note that Michelman's point of comparison lay between
insurance rights and Rawls' difference principle. Rawls would point out that the
principle is intended to apply across a range of laws and institutions, much like Equal
Protection. It would figure in what Michelman now nicely refers to as "the
[democratic] practice by which we test, exchange, revise.. .the constitutional-
interpretive judgments [that decide]... from time to time, the 'institutional
settlements' we need." See Frank I. Michelman, Democracy-Based Resistance to a
Constitutional Right of Social Citizenship: A Comment on Forbath, 69 Fordham L.
Rev. 1893 (2001). Over time, this practice gives normative and narrative content and
push to the most general equality norms.
269. Id. at 1896.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1895-96.
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concern distinct from justiciability. It does not concern courts'
remedial competence or democratic deficits, nor whether a given
norm is too general and wide-open-to-competing-interpretations.
Rather, it concerns how widely or narrowly a norm "preempt[s] major
public policy choices from the ordinary politics of democratic debate
and decision."'272 More than a welfare right, a constitutional social-
citizenship right "reach[es] in a hundred directions, into the deepest
redoubts of the common law and the most basic choices of political
economy a modern society can make."2r  Certainly, if I am right
about the way these rights have figured in public political discourse
and debate about everything from railroads to currency to education
to industrial organization, then Michelman is right. And note:
Michelman's point pertains independently of the scope of judicial
enforceability, as long as we presume our public officials to be
conscientious. It is the latter to whom social citizenship's claims
always have been addressed. Michelman's current thinking has
merged with that reform tradition's conception of how its norms
would bear on democratic lawmaking-not via judicial review, but
instead by directly guiding and constraining participants (and the
standards they apply and the arguments they offer) in debates and
decisions about public policy-making.
Over against the charge of non-"narrowness" or democracy-
stymying, Michelman offers a defense on behalf of social citizenship
norms. It is precisely the "blatant 'non-justiciability' of a social-
citizenship right-its utter lack of mechanical applicability to any hard
or contested question of public policy" -that "saves it from charges of
contrariety to democracy." 74 Instead of thwarting democracy, social
citizenship norms would mark a "gain for democracy" by "imposing a
certain constraint on how citizens and their elected representatives
would frame and approach sundry questions of public policy." That
is, the norms would demand of all concerned an "exercise of judgment
about which choice will best conduce to the social citizenship of
everyone"-much as the 1940s ALI notables had envisioned.
By invoking Michelman present to respond to Michelman past, we
have strayed from Michelman on Rawls and welfare rights in 1973.
The burden of this foray into the present has been to suggest that
Michelman's erstwhile insistence on the justiciability of social and
economic rights in non-judicial fora was a product of the politics and
doctrine of the day. Welfare rights seemed politically possible and
possibly immanent in doctrinal developments; an inspiring movement
was pressing for them, and this motivated a search for arguments.
Some have proved strained. One of these was the contention that
welfare rights were strongly justiciable, in contrast to other possible
272. Id at 1895.
273. Id at 1897.
274. Id at 1898.
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ways of constitutionalizing a social minimum or social citizenship.
Also strained was the premise that justiciability- objective and
mechanical application-ought to matter much when the arenas of
norm application were public political debate over, and legislative
hammering out of, public policy. In prescribing for those arenas, we
do better to focus on the substance of our substantive norms, and on
that count we do better to follow the path of social citizenship down
which Rawls' guidance more naturally points us.
There is more to say about the interaction of social citizenship
norms and democratic politics and lawmaking, and more of
Michelman's insights and qualms to which to respond. But further
consideration should await a reading of Michelman's republican case
for welfare rights. This brings us to his turn to history, and his
thoughtful reading of Progressive constitutionalism.
V. A REPUBLICAN CASE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS
A. The Distributive Dimension of Constitutional Property Rights and
the Problem of Legal Form
By the late 1970s, the Court had begun to cut the solicitous strands
of doctrine well short of substantive welfare rights, declaring ever
more categorically that its Constitution confers "no affirmative right
to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure
life, liberty, or property." '275 Liberal constitutional scholarship grew
more theoretical and more historical as the Court grew more
conservative. Theorists acknowledged the limits of judicial
competence and legitimacy in the area of affirmative rights. They
began to reflect on the "gap between the reach of constitutional case
law and the reach of the Constitution. 27 6 They built up more general,
less court-centered accounts of constitutional democracy as a system
of self-government.
For his part, Michelman made civic republicanism and
contemporary pragmatism and critical theory his own, and brought
them into an internal dialogue with liberal constitutional theory. Out
of this emerged a profound series of reflections on the dilemmas of
constitutional self-government, the tensions between popular
sovereignty and the rule of law, the nature of adjudication, and, most
germane here, the "possessive" and "distributive" conceptions of
constitutional property rights.277  Written in 1986, Michelman's
275. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196
(1989).
276. See Sager, supra note 15, at 419.
277. See, e.g., Frank Michelman & Margaret Jane Radin, Symposium Commentary:
Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1019
(1991); Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional
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exploration of the tensions between these two kinds of property
norms sets out to reconstruct the republican logic and history of the
distributive side of constitutional property claims, to suggest why this
side has been the recessive one in constitutional law, and to join issue
with those, like Michael Walzer, who object for staunchly democratic
reasons to the constitutionalization of "welfare claims as rights."'
Michelman seized hold of the "Founders" venerable republican
conviction that "security of property holdings" was not just a matter
of private self-interest; it was of general political concern. Material
independence was viewed as indispensable if one's "independence
and competence as a participant in public affairs was to be
guaranteed."279  This maxim had obvious bearing on the
antiredistributive, property-protecting provisions in the founders'
Constitution; but it also implied a distributive imperative. This
imperative too found support in much that the founders wrote and
did. But it found no obvious expression in the provisions and
architecture of their Constitution. The distributive norm was
deferred, Michelman suggests. Given the prospect of westward
expansion, the founding generation could envision "a freehold
beneath every household ... supporting the freeholder's
independence."'  As long as this state of affairs continued,
Michelman explains, in terms that evoke Roosevelt's constitutional
narrative with uncanny precision, the Constitution's possessive regard
for property was sufficient to answer the founders' distributive
concerns.
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, a "Progressive
critique" of this constitutional arrangement had emerged. With the
rise of industrial capitalism, a regime of anti-redistributive property
rights-so the critique ran-might itself "constitute undemocratic
relations of power and subjection.""s On this account, persons-wage
earners, tenant farmers and others-"subjected to the proprietary
power of others lacked.., the material foundations of independent
political competence."'  In short, with the rise of large-scale
corporate enterprise and its impact on the legal-political-intellectual
culture of the late nineteenth century, the distributive and anti-
Argument Voting Rights, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 443 (1989); Frank Michelman, Law's
Republic, 97 Yale LJ. 1493 (1988); Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in
the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 1319 (1987); Frank I. Michelman,
The Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L
Rev. 4 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Traces of Self-Government].
278. See Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of
Property, supra note 277. The essay by Michael Walzer which Michelman addresses is
Michael Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 Pol. Theory 379 (1981).
279. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property,
supra note 277, at 1329.
280. Id. at 1332.
281. Id. at 1335.
281 Id.
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redistributive sides of our tradition's constitutional understanding of
property claims were set on a collision course. Once it was firmly
recognized that "uncontrolled so-called private power" exposes
individuals to subjection, it behooved government to act. "Logically,
however, the state cannot offer protection... by the same formal law
that would protect absolutely against redistributive political
'interventions."'" 3 Accordingly, while the Progressive critique largely
succeeded in undoing the regime of anti-redistributive property
norms, it did not succeed, on Michelman's account, in supplanting
those norms with distributive ones. Indeed, Michelman implies that
the Progressive reformers never sought to embed such distributive
norms into constitutional discourse. They hardly could have hoped to
do so, it appears in his view, since distributive norms, whatever their
claim to constitutional status, seem to place an unbearable burden on
our commitment to formally realizable, objective, "law"-like
standards as the sole, legitimate lingua franca in the "province and
discourse" of the Constitution.1"
As you might guess, I am on all fours with Michelman and he with
me all the way to the last point. There, as an historical and
interpretative matter we seem to part ways in modest degree; for I
read the Progressives, and their forebears and descendants, stretching
from the 1880s-1940s--generations of reformers whom, following
Michelman, for present purposes, I'll simply call Progressives-
somewhat differently. As my brief sketch of Croly (a Progressive in
the stricter sense) and his Populist predecessors and New Deal
progeny all showed, these Progressives found no insoluble tension
inherent in the effort to "cast substantively appealing and defensible
distributive norms" as constitutional standards.8 5  They did not
neglect "'the classical negative understanding of fundamental
rights' '26 (how could they?); nor the appeal that understanding made
to a deep-seated image of constitutional norms as "strongly
objective"-abstract, simple, formal-and, thereby, law-like. But they
treated the grip of these ideas on "the American constitutional
imagination" 7 as contingent and contestable-via tools Michelman
knows well: pragmatism, context, a "living Constitution." Thus, as we
saw, the need to make the constitutional tradition's distributive
imperatives into direct claims against the state did not compel
divorcing constitutional from political economic discourse; it did
283. Id. at 1336.
284. See id. at 1337.
285. Id. at 1321 (emphasis in original).
286. Id. (quoting David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53
U. Chi. L. Rev. 864,889 (1986)).
287. Id.
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demand dethroning the courts and installing Congress and the "active
branches" as the nation's new "constitutional political economists."'
In tandem with this reallocation of interpretive authority, we saw
how Progressives set about the hermeneutic task of translating "the
old and sacred possessive [common-law based and anti-redistributive]
rights" of property and labor into new "social and economic rights,"
to enable "a return to values lost in the course of... economic
development" and "a recovery" of the old rights' once robust social
meaningtm  The "active branches" and the citizenry itself, so
Progressives like Croly and the New Dealers contended, were better
suited to the task of interpreting and applying the new "social
meaning" of constitutional property norms-in part for the kinds of
justiciability reasons Michelman highlights, but also because, as we
saw in both Croly's theorizing and FDR's more popularly accessible
constitutional discourse, they sought to advance a more dialogic and
democratic mode of constitutional interpretation and decision-
making.290
If I am right about this history, I do no more than provide an
ancestry for Michelman's effort to unsettle our conventional
understanding of the forms of constitutional law and democratic
politics. Michelman's urging is this. If we can but relax the hold of
our inherited ideal of legality in favor of a revised and more pragmatic
one, then we might open the space for a fuller consideration of
"distributive property claims" in the "provincef and discourse] of
constitutional law.
291
B. Republicanism Versus Welfare Rights
Perhaps because his attention rests so largely upon the seeming
tension between distributive norms and "legal" ones, and perhaps
because his proof text is Walzer's critique of the idea of constitutional
legalization of welfare rights, welfare rights remain Michelman's only
specification of what a modem distributive constitutional property
288. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (quoting FDR). Nor were they
unmindful of the problem Michelman identifies of mediating between distributive and
possessive property claims. See Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the
Constitutional Idea of Property, supra note 277, at 1321. Progressive reformers like
Brandeis and Commons devoted vast attention to reconciling the various possessive
property claims of employers with such social rights as minimum livelihoods and
unemployment insurance and with the claims of employees, as of right, to a voice in
the governance of the enterprise. It is true, though, that their efforts at reconciliation,
while principled, did not take the form of "strongly objective standards" but were
rather more contextual and pragmatic. See, e.g., John R Commons, Legal Foundations
of Capitalism (1924).
290. Compare Michelman, Traces of Self-Governunent, supra note 277, with
Michelman & Radin, supra note 277.
291. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property,
supra note 277, at 1324.
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claim-deserving of our more ample consideration-might be. As a
result, another, perhaps equally deep tension goes unexplored. That
is the tension between the modern welfare rights claim and the
republican underpinning Michelman aims to provide for it.
Republican maxims hold that a measure of material independence
is a necessary basis for political competence and standing. That is
Michelman's normative baseline. But in the republican outlook he
invokes, such citizenly standing and competence have always been
bound up with the status of one who fulfills some recognized,
responsible role in the social enterprise-one who "earns" her
measure of material security and "independence."292 We certainly
may find, as far back as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
support in both "liberal" and "republican" texts for the view that the
poor have a subsistence claim on society's resources. In truth, that
claim was well-defended by Locke; it is there too in the writings of
Adam Smith.293 But that is a far cry from making this longstanding
claim a basis for citizenship in the sense of full membership in the
political community. Neither Locke, nor Smith, nor Madison and
Jefferson in the "republican" texts Michelman relies on,294 nor later
renderings of liberalism and republicanism, up to and including
Professors Rawls and Sandel-none of these lend support to the idea
of making public assistance simpliciter the material base of citizenship.
That base, that dignifying social minimum, must rest on some socially
recognized contribution on a person's part to the common enterprise.
292. See William E. Forbath, Ambiguities of Free Labor: Law and Labor in the
Gilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 767 (tracing this theme in republican discourse of
political and legal elites and labor reformers in U.S. from 1780s to 1880s); Forbath,
supra note 22, at 13-15, 18-19, 26-51 (same, adding inflections of theme in women's,
African-American, and agrarian movements, and carrying forward into 1890s-1930s).
293. Regarding Locke, see, e.g., John Locke, I Two Treatises of Government 42
(Peter Laslett ed. 1960) (poor man has a right to "Title to so much out of Another's
Plenty as will keep him from extreme want"); Thomas A. Home, Property Rights and
Poverty 48-65 (1990); Richard Ashcraft, Liberalism and the Problem of Poverty, 6
Crit. Rev. 493 (1993) (Locke and classical liberalism emphasize natural right to
subsistence). Regarding Smith, see, e.g., Adam Smith, II An Inquiry into the Nature
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 80 (London: Methuen & Co. 1950) (1776) ("No
society can be flourishing ... of which [any substantial number of members] are poor
and miserable."); Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Idea of Poverty 46 (1983) (arguing that
Smith makes improving the condition of society's poorest members a key criterion for
judging economic systems): Istvan Hont & Michael Ignatieff, Needs and Justice in the
Wealth of Nations: An Introductory Essay, in Wealth and Virtue, the Shaping of
Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment 1-44 (Hont & Ignatieff eds. 1983)
(meeting needs of poor as Smith's theoretical axis for assessing political-economic
arrangements).
294. For a Madison or Jefferson, poor relief left paupers still "dependent" and,
therefore, unqualified for citizenship. They favored ample material opportunities
(they even occasionally championed rights to property in "full and absolute
dominion") for all white men willing and able to exploit them, and charity or coercion
for the rest. See Forbath, supra note 22, at 13-14 (discussing and quoting from the
Madison and Jefferson texts relied on by Michelman and other constitutional welfare
rights defenders like Sunstein).
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CONCLUSION: BEYOND WELFARE RIGHTS
This may not be necessary in every liberal democratic society today
to assure a person's standing as an "equal participant in public
affairs." But to use a phrase with which Michelman recently has
conjured, this account seems firmly embedded in America's
"constitutional identity."2 95 The longstanding links between work,
equal respect, and citizenship seem constitutive of "who we think we
are and aim to be as a politically constituted people," of "where we
think we have come from and where we think we are headed."
The idea that welfare rights fitted well with either a liberal or a
republican understanding of the material bases of equal citizenship
first was forged in the context of the welfare rights movement, as a
scholar's contribution to that inspiring struggle. But the movement,
like any social movement of subordinate people, was sharply
constrained. It played the hand that history and the White House
dealt it. Its programmatic vision, its strategy and goals, all were
shaped by the social provision and institutional resources at hand-
AFDC, Legal Services, and a sympathetic federal bench. But nothing
about this conjuncture gave any assurance that welfare rights were the
right solution to the problem of social and economic exclusion
confronting poor black citizens. Black leaders like King and Rustin
plainly thought othervise; they called for a "Negroes' New Deal" that
emphasized decent work. As a normative matter, I have suggested,
they were right.
The welfare rights movement's vision of citizenship also was shaped
by the fact that the movement's constituents were women and
mothers. King and Rustin had nothing to say about this fact, and little
enough to say about gender equality in general. But everything we
know about women's experience wvith welfare and work suggests that
welfare provision-while a moral imperative-cannot do the main
tasks of securing gender equality for poor women. That also demands
reforming the low wage labor market, assuring decent jobs for
women, no less than men, and providing enabling rights, as well, to
training and child care.
A liberal society that prizes the dignity of the individual, if it is an
affluent one, which can afford a guaranteed income that protects all
against desperate want, must do so. To refuse is, in Rawls' terms, to
put an unbearable and unjust strain on individuals' commitments to
the social compact. But that is not enough. Equal citizenship also
requires social citizenship. The two are not in conflict; they work
together. This is especially so if I am right that America may reform
but will not abandon the less eligibility principle of classical liberalism.
Suppose we were to embrace social citizenship and embrace as well a
295. See Frank I. Michelman, Morality, Identity and "Constitutional Patriotism," 76
Denv. U. L. Rev. 1009 (1999).
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generous, pluralistic conception of valued "work." Would we not
reward those who performed such work more than those, not
incapacitated, who did not? The guaranteed income the latter
received would afford them freedom from desperate want-an
income not far above the poverty level; it still would be a materially
drab and circumscribed life, amid abundance. For the first time,
however, such austerity would be defensible, because those who lived
such lives also would be assured real opportunities for work and
earning a more ample livelihood.
Of course, any such scheme is liable to err: in judging whether
individuals can "measure up to generally reasonable minimum
standards of active participation in the economy," or assessing "the
extenuating force of [their] disabilities," or more generally, in assuring
that the system of rewards and transfers leaves no one "desperately
unprovisioned. ''296 We would significantly diminish the toll of those
errors by providing a guaranteed income. But we would not rely on a
guaranteed income for what it cannot do. We would not delude
ourselves that a welfare guarantee could undo the stigma of
permanent exclusion from a shared destiny of work and opportunity.
Once one embraces the view that a republican constitution must
vouchsafe the social conditions of democratic lawmaking, one cannot
leave the question of social citizenship where Michelman left it in
these articles. One cannot leave the work- and economic-
independence-and-participation-related aspects of social citizenship to
the give and take of ordinary politics. Specification of what counts as
decent work or recognized but non-waged contribution, and how, at a
particular time, the nation ought to go about assuring such
opportunities to all, of what counts as a decent livelihood at said time,
of what counts as incapacity, and of what quantum of income should
separate those, not incapacitated, who avail themselves of "welfare"
or a guaranteed income versus those who "work"-all these issues
and more may and, practically, must be addressed through political
and market processes. But if social citizenship rights are prerequisites
to political equality, then they must precede ordinary politics. In their
general form as positive and enabling rights, they must become part of
the constitutional framework, part of the law of lawmaking.
Otherwise, a broad swathe of the citizenry will be denied-as today
they are denied-a constitutionally fair opportunity to act as citizen-
participants in the very debates and decision-making upon which their
citizenly standing depends.2 7
How substantial the role of courts is in defining and enforcing these
rights is a separate question. Historically, it always was envisioned as
296. See Michelman, supra note 11, at 15-16 n.21.
297. 1 am borrowing here the general form of an argument he makes against
Charles Fried, in Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 Wash. L. Q. 659,
682-84.
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a modest one. Were we to agree that social citizenship is a political
right, we would only(!) be agreeing to this. When and where
important rules and institutions of political and economic life are
subject to scrutiny and affirmation, negation or revision, there the
demands of social citizenship may be raised. The arena may be
Congress, the federal agencies, or the broader, "informal public
sphere" of "opinion and will formation,"' as well as the courts. But
there challenges may be raised against, and reasons must be given for
existing arrangements, reasons which speak to the claims of social
citizenship.
Would that it were not so. Would that we could broaden the
material base of equal citizenship "merely" by instituting the simpler,
arguably more liberal, and arguably more efficient means of a "basic"
or "citizen's income," and leave the rest to ordinary politics. That
proposal looms large in social citizenship debates abroad and has its
important United States proponents.29 Many of its champions are
prompted by the essential, but lately overdrawn, insight that
government is significantly limited in its capacity to broaden the base
of citizenship by broadening the base of work.-' They suggest that a
generous basic income would enable people in the lower rungs of the
labor market to resist demeaning and exploitative jobs; thus it would
contribute indirectly to reforming that world of work. Often, these
basic income proponents assail efforts to reconstruct the low wage
labor market in the name of decent livelihoods-say, by instituting
wage supplements. Such measures, they argue, carry forward the
coercive implications of the nineteenth century workhouse, forcing
poor citizens into menial wage labor, when there is no intrinsic moral
value to such work.301
True: demeaning, endless toil is not dignifying. It is not mandated
but forbidden by the norms of social citizenship. Any work that does
not earn one enough to avoid poverty for oneself and one's family is
not adequate. But "menial work" can be meliorated; countless
demeaning workplaces could benefit from a measure of democracy.
298. See generally Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (1998).
299. Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott's thinking runs in this direction. See Bruce
Ackerman & Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society 11 (1999). Ackerman and
Alstott champion giving all citizens a sum of money to invest, rather than assuring
them decent jobs. Alstott has provided a sustained basic-income based liberal
critique of efforts to secure social citizenship through reforms of the low-wage labor
markets, job creation and the like. See Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal
Challenge to Employment Subsidies, 108 Yale LJ. 967, 971 (1999)(-The case for
employment subsidies rests on mistaken or morally dubious claims about the intrinsic
or instrumental value of paid work.").
300. See id.; see also Guy Standing, The Need for a New Social Consensus, in
Arguing for Basic Income 47-60 (Phillipe Van Parijs ed. 1992).
301. See Alstott, supra note 299; Phillipe Van Parijs, Basic Income Capitalism, 102
Ethics 465 (1992); Phillipe Van Parijs, Why Surfers Should be Fed: The Liberal Case
for an Unconditional Basic Income, 20 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 101 (1991).
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Many ill-paid jobs could be decently paid, without stopping up the
springs of enterprise. Meeting unmet public needs could generate
new jobs. The kinds of toil and contributions to society that count as
compensable "work" could be enlarged. There are limits, but what
can be done must be done. Everyday work sometimes feels like
everyday dying. But for the nation's poor, exclusion from the
everyday world of regular work and decent livelihoods is a kind of
social death; it marks one as unworthy and saps self-respect and social
recognition.
Some feminist theorists argue that a basic income, in virtue of being
untethered to employment and the labor market, would enable poor
women to fulfill women's traditional caring roles in ways that
(somehow) did not reproduce an oppressive gender division of
labor."° For my part, I concur with those who would afford a decent
income to women or men who choose to depart from the labor market
in order to devote a portion of their "work" lives to the care of young
children or old parents. Such a measure would also relieve
government of some of the burden of assuring decent wage work. As
I've indicated, however, I am concerned that this kind of measure
should not substitute for providing rights to decent employment and
affordable childcare for those who would rather not devote
themselves to such full-time family work. I also doubt whether a
universal basic income would impart the same recognition to citizens
who assume this socially valued responsibility.
Finally, some basic income proponents envision a new birth of
"community work" and voluntary associations, springing from the
emancipation of the poor from the labor market.3 This vision of
once-marginalized people transformed into full-time citizens, thanks
to an end to paid work, is an attractive utopia. But like many of the
arguments advanced for a basic income, many of them close
descendants of the arguments made on behalf of a Guaranteed
Adequate Income in the 1960s, it rubs against the grain of our
constitutional identity.
I may be wrong. Who we are and aim to be and where we think we
are headed may be undergoing revaluations I understand too dimly.
In any case, I do not urge a return to the social citizenship tradition in
its salad days. The welfare rights movement, in its sharp departures
from that older tradition, embodied an enduring critique of the latter's
coercive, illiberal and gendered aspects, of its idealization of toil, and
of its all-too-narrow conception of socially valued contributions to the
common good. This critique has become part of the muted but
ongoing conversation about social citizenship in America-about
302. See, e.g., Carole Pateman, The Patriarchal Welfare State, in Democracy and the
Welfare State 231,238 (Amy Gutmann ed. 1988).
303. See, e.g., Bill Jordan, Basic Income and the Common Good, in Arguing for
Basic Income 155-77 (Phillippe Van Parijs ed. 1992).
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citizenship, personhood, and equal standing, and their relationship to
work and a social minimum. There are constitutional stakes in that
conversation, and constitutional thinkers and advocates must return to
it.3
304. While Michelman has not returned to the question of equal citizenship's
material bases since the 1980s, he plainly does not disagree. No one is harder at work
today on behalf of the proposition that "'liberal democratic constitutionalism' must be
a name for a social form of life as well as for a set of procedures for political
decisionmaking." The constitutionalism Michelman has begun to expound is one
whose Bill of Rights is also "a bill of entitlements" and one that apparently reaches
the "laws [that shape our] ... work and workplaces" as well as "schools, housing,
property, speech, the media, and so on." Frank I. Michelman, Progressive-Liberal
Democratic Constitutionalism, 4 Widener L. Symp. J. 181,194-95 (1999).
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